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ABSTRACT 
Inbound and domestic hostile takeover activity in India has failed to 
make a dent in the corporate vocabulary for historical, cultural, and 
regulatory reasons. Instead, the scale of negotiated “friendly” deals in 
India has been on the rise. Under current regulations, Indian promoters 
are permitted to hold large stakes in their corporations and are warned in 
advance when potentially hostile acquirers gain toeholds in their 
corporations, enabling them to consequently consolidate their holdings. 
Severe restrictions imposed by India’s central bank on financing 
acquisitions add to the difficulties for potential buyers. Historically, the 
loyalty of domestic institutional investors to established promoter houses 
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made it difficult to unseat the interests of entrenched Indian promoters. 
Culturally, nationalist sentiment has formed an invisible barrier to hostile 
takeover activity in India, as regulators continue to side with India’s 
“national champions.” Restrictive foreign investment regulations have 
long precluded the agility of the inbound raider. However, in recent times 
the regulatory and historical landscape in India has metamorphosed 
dramatically. Shareholding patterns in Indian corporations have 
undergone significant change with the inflow of foreign strategic and 
institutional investors as foreign investment restrictions have also been 
relaxed. Further, the market for corporate control in India has seen 
interesting movement in the past few years. This Article addresses two 
questions. First and foremost, it analyzes whether there is a legitimate 
possibility that the market for corporate control will gain a greater 
foothold in India and whether invisible barriers still preclude hostile 
acquisitions in India. Second, assuming that the answer to the first 
question is in the affirmative, this Article seeks to address the question of 
whether the most widely known conventional shark repellent deal defense 
mechanism, viz. the poison pill, is possible under the Indian regulatory 
regime, although it has been ruled out in previous academic writings.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Inbound and domestic hostile takeover activity in India has failed to make 
a dent in the corporate vocabulary. In two renowned incidents, hostile 
attempts by Swaraj Paul to acquire a stake in the Escorts Group, and by 
Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) to acquire a position in Asian Paints 
Limited have been thwarted,
1
 without the subsequent sounding of alarm bells 
in India’s corporate boardrooms. Conversely, the scale of negotiated 
―friendly‖ deals in India has been on the rise; in the first two months of 2010 
alone, the total dollar value of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) deals in 
India surpassed valuations seen in 2009.
2
  
Hostile acquisitions in India have typically faced historical, cultural, and 
regulatory barriers. Indian regulations permit companies to go public with 
only a small slice of the company subject to mandatory public shareholding 
requirements. Consequently, Indian promoters typically hold vast stakes in 
their companies and consolidate their holdings without triggering penalties. 
Culturally, families and ―friends-of-the-family‖ have dominated Indian 
corporations, seldom willing to enter into transactions that may adversely 
impact revenue streams accruing to future generations in the family. 
Historically, the loyalty of domestic financial institutions to Indian promoters 
has made it difficult to oust the dominant promoters of a corporation. 
Nationalist sentiment has also been an invisible barrier precluding hostile 
takeover activity in India,
3
 as policies requiring regulatory approval in the 
event of foreign investment were designed to shield domestic industry from 
foreign onslaught. This has not prevented India’s ―national champions‖ from 
seeking outbound synergies, even in hostile contexts.  
However, in recent times the regulatory, cultural, and historical landscape 
in India has metamorphosed substantially. Shareholding patterns in Indian 
corporations have undergone significant change with the inflow of foreign 
strategic and institutional investors. Foreign investment has been made 
easier, or ―automatic‖ for the overwhelming majority of sectors previously 
 
 
 1. Shaun J. Mathew, Hostile Takeovers in India: New Prospects, Challenges, and Regulatory 
Opportunities, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 800, 811–12. 
 2. See infra text accompanying note 38.  
 3. Cyril Shroff, You Need a Defence Strategy, 27 INT’L FIN. L. REV. 40, 40 (2008).  
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bracketed by sector-specific investment ―caps.‖ Further, the market for 
corporate control in India has seen interesting movement in the past few 
years. In 1998, in a privately negotiated transaction, Indian Cements Ltd. 
became the first successful raider to acquire a stake in an unwilling Indian 
target,
4
 Raasi Cement Ltd.
5
 A decade later, in 2008, Emami Ltd.’s 
acquisition of Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd., in a negotiated ―friendly‖ 
deal that had deep hostile undertones, exposed the vulnerability of Indian 
corporations to hostile takeover.
6
 In 2007, Harish Bhasin’s HB Stockholdings 
Ltd. acquired a stake in DCM Shriram Industries Ltd., in an unsuccessful 
battle that witnessed share warrants being issued to promoters.
7
 More 
recently, Grasim Industries Limited’s hostile bid for Larsen & Toubro Ltd. 
(L&T) that was initiated by acquiring the stake of Reliance Industries Ltd.
8
 
(which itself had tried to acquire L&T in the 1980s),
9
 Pramod Jain’s hostile 
takeover bid for the Dalmia Group’s Golden Tobacco Ltd.,10 rumors of a 
possible acquisition by Alcan Inc. and Sterlite Industry of Hindalco 
Industries, Ltd.,
11
 Kohinoor Foods Ltd.’s fears that a Temptation Foods Ltd.-
led consortium was attempting a covert hostile acquisition,
12
 the Dalmia 
Group’s interest in Gesco Corp.,13 Jagajit Jaiswal’s bid for Jagatjit Industries, 
Ltd. which witnessed the use of shares with differential voting rights as a 
defensive maneuver,
14
 and the acquisition by Analjit Singh of a stake in East 
India Hotels, Ltd. with the reported intent of warding off hostile takeover 
 
 
 4. Mathew, supra note 1, at 813–14. 
 5. Satvik Verma, Hostile Takeovers: Is India Inc. Ready? ECON. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2009, http:// 
economictimes.indiatimes.com/Opinion/Comments-Analysis/Hostile-takeovers-Is-India-Inc-ready/article 
show/5074233.cms.  
 6. Emami Acquires Controlling Stake in Zandu, HINDU BUS. LINE, Oct. 17, 2008, http://www. 
blonnet.com/2008/10/17/stories/2008101752470100.htm.  
 7. HB Stockholdings Ltd. v. DCM Shriram Indus. Ltd., (2009) 175 D.L.T. 443 (Del.).  
 8. L&T To Sell 11.5% in UltraTech; Aditya Birla Group May Pick It Up, REUTERS, May 11, 
2009, http://in.reuters.com/article/2009/05/11/idINIndia-39544920090511. 
 9. 10 Corporate Battles To Remember, LIVEMINT.COM, May 9, 2010, http://www.livemint.com/ 
2010/05/09211443/10-corporate-battles-to-rememb.html.  
 10. Dev Chatterji et al., Pramod Jain Makes Hostile Takeover Bid for Dalmia’s Golden Tobacco, 
ECON. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2009, http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/news-by-industry/cons-products/ 
tobacco/Pramod-Jain-makes-hostile-takeover-bid-for-Dalmias-Golden-Tobacco/articleshow/5224620.cms.  
 11. Priya Nadkarni, Hindalco Shares Rise 4% on Takeover Buzz, BUS. STANDARD, June 5, 2007, 
http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/hindalco-shares-rise-4takeover-buzz/286653/.  
 12. Basmati King Kohinoor Faces Hostile Takeover, ECON. TIMES, June 27, 2008, http:// 
economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/3170682.cms.  
 13. C.R.L. Narasimhan, Greenmail, Winners and Losers–The Gesco Takeover Battle, HINDU, 
Jan. 10, 2001, http://www.hinduonnet.com/2001/01/10/stories/0610000a.htm. 
 14. Baiju Kalesh, Promoters Set to Benefit from Clarity on DVRs, LIVEMINT.COM, May 6, 2008, 
http://www.livemint.com/2008/05/05235749/Promoters-set-to-benefit-from.html; see also Anand Pershad 
Jaiswal v. Jagatjit Indus. Ltd., (2009) C.L.B. MANU/CL/0002/2009. 
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attempts from ITC, Ltd.,
15
 signifies that the hostile acquisition is an avenue 
that cannot be ruled out in India. One of India’s finest transactional lawyers 
has even suggested that India faces a coming ―wave of hostile 
acquisitions.‖16  
In 2009, M&A deal volumes in India were valued at a meager $10 billion 
with a total of 267 deals (142 domestic and 125 cross-border).
17
 This number 
was down 67% from 2008, during which 445 deals worth $30.72 billion took 
place, and a further 80% from 2007, during which 676 deals worth $51.11 
billion took place.
18
 The largest attempted deal of 2009, a proposed $23 
billion stock swap between telecom giants Bharti Airtel, Ltd. and MTN 
Group of South Africa, fell through on account of regulatory hurdles.
19
 The 
2008 financial crisis witnessed large scale capital outflows as foreign 
institutional investors withdrew their investments from Indian companies.
20
 
However, the global financial meltdown has also formed the backdrop to the 
rise of Asian economies with the M&A market in India in its nascent stages. 
In November of 2008, the world also witnessed the largest inbound 
investment in India ever, with the acquisition by Daiichi Sankyo Co., Ltd. of 
Japan of a 64% stake in Ranbaxy Laboratories, Ltd. for $4 billion. Factoring 
into the statistical map the tendency of M&A activity to occur in cyclical 
waves,
21
 inbound deal activity in India may show signs of improvement. 
This Article addresses two questions. Part II of this Article analyzes 
whether there is a legitimate possibility that the market for corporate control 
will gain a greater foothold in India and whether invisible barriers still 
preclude hostile acquisitions in India. Assuming that the answer to the first 
question is in the affirmative, Part III seeks to address whether the most 
widely known conventional ―shark repellent‖ deal defense mechanism—the 
 
 
 15. Analjit Entry Could Ward Off Hostile Takeovers at EIH, ECON. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2009, http:// 
economictimes.indiatimes.com/Features/The-Sunday-ET/Companies/Analjit-entry-could-ward-off-hostile 
-takeover-at-EIH/articleshow/5135102.cms.  
 16. Shroff, supra note 3, at 40. 
 17. Rupali Mukherjee, With 267 Deals, Mergers and Acquisitions Cross $10 Billion, ECON. 
TIMES, Dec. 19, 2009, http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/news-by-company/corporate-trends/ 
With-267-deals-mergers-and-acquisitions-cross-10-billion/articleshow/5353946.cms. 
 18. Fewer Mergers in 2008 as Companies Hold on to Cash, ECON. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2008, http:// 
economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/news-by-company/corporate-trends/Fewer-mergers-in-2008-as-
companies-hold-on-to-cash/articleshow/3880367.cms. 
 19. Amol Sharma, India’s M&A Comeback: Big Ticket Deals Should Return in 2010, WALL ST. 
J., Jan. 4, 2010, http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2010/01/04/indias-ma-comeback-big-ticket-deals-should-
return-in-2010. 
 20. See, e.g., India’s External Liabilities Rise on FII Outflows, ECON. TIMES, May 26, 2009, 
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/News/Economy/Indicators/Indias-external-liabilities-rise-on-FII-
outflows/articleshow/4581507.cms.  
 21. F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE 153–59 (3d ed. 1990).  
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poison pill—is possible under the Indian regulatory regime, despite that it has 
been ruled out elsewhere.
22
 
In addition to outlining what this Article seeks to achieve, it is also 
important to define what this Article will not achieve: namely, any 
investigation into the policy merits of hostile acquisitions, or mergers and 
acquisitions generally, and whether their possible advent in India would have 
beneficial or disadvantageous consequences.
23
 Rather, this Article focuses 
practically on the possibility of increased incidents of hostile takeovers and 
potential strategies that businesses may employ to defend themselves from 
hostile acquirers. Neither does this Article attempt to measure the financial 
viability of acquiring Indian corporations. It is often suggested that domestic 
hostile acquisition activity in India has not taken off primarily on account of 
the contrast between the inherent growth opportunities for domestic business 
and the heavy costs of acquisition, which may make more financial sense in 
saturated markets. Financial assessments aside, this Article seeks to examine 
the theoretical possibility of the hostile acquisition route in India, and the 
ability of industrial houses to defend themselves from the enemy at the gates.  
Part II seeks to analyze and reassess the exogenous factors that have 
historically been associated with the absence of a market for corporate 
control in India in order to determine whether these still hold true today. For 
instance, what is the ability of Indian promoters to hold large stakes in their 
corporations against the present factual vulnerability of corporations to 
hostile takeover in India based on promoter holdings in corporations listed on 
the BSE-200 Index? An analysis of the acquisition by Emami, Ltd. of Zandu 
Pharmaceuticals, Ltd., for example, exposes the vulnerability of ―cozy 
relationships‖ that defined Indian business decades ago as well as the ability 
of hostile acquirers to potentially negotiate with the target board by obtaining 
―blocking rights‖ in the target. 
Next, this Article compares early warning mechanisms established by 
Indian takeover law against similar American regulations. It discovers that 
agile acquirers can thwart the potency of the early warning requirement by 
launching a mandatory tender offer within two days of acquiring a stake 
below fifteen percent. This Part identifies and assesses various hurdles 
relating to acquisition finance, and it concludes by finding that these apply 
equally to friendly and hostile acquisitions and do not hinder the foreign 
hostile acquirer from tapping foreign financing avenues.  
 
 
 22. Mathew, supra note 1, at 822–24. 
 23. For a study of the impact of mergers on corporate performance in India, see Murugesan 
Selvam et al., Impact of Mergers on the Corporate Performance of Acquirer and Target Companies in 
India, 5 J. MODERN ACCT. & AUDITING 55 (2009).  
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Part II also examines foreign investment restrictions that dominated the 
Indian regulatory environment in light of the ―new‖ liberalization in 2006, 
where the overwhelming majority of sectors were opened to the ―automatic‖ 
investment route. It examines two latent hostile acquisition defenses inherent 
in the structuring of Indian corporations—one based on Press Note 2 (2009) 
and the other on the size of the investment that the hostile acquirer proposes 
to make. This protection is based on the fact that some Indian corporations 
may have potentially large investments in diversified businesses or different 
business branches or undertakings in sectors prohibited to foreign 
investment. Finally, this Part examines potential changes in antitrust law in 
India, and other invisible hurdles to the hostile acquisition, including due 
diligence, the dominance of litigation, and the likely effects that these two 
may have on takeover activity.  
Part III attempts to answer the question of whether a conventional flip-in 
poison pill can be designed for India’s regulatory environment. It begins by 
analyzing the features of a conventional pill plan that would not be workable 
in the Indian environment and tries to address these difficulties. After briefly 
setting out the blueprint of the takeover battle provided in India’s Takeover 
Code, this Part sets out several possible shark repellent poison pill-type 
mechanisms that an Indian board may adopt, for example, the share warrant 
defense, the rights issue defense, and the employee stock option defense. It 
concludes by identifying the possibilities of a staggered board and other 
embedded defenses in India, and assessing the general difficulties that shark 
repellent tactics may pose to Indian corporate law and policy.  
II. BARRIERS TO HOSTILE ACQUISITION: ARE THEY INSURMOUNTABLE? 
The regulatory landscape of India is punctuated by overlapping 
functions.
24
 There are three identifiable spheres of regulation with which the 
prospective hostile acquirer may have to contend. In the first sphere, foreign 
investment policy is regulated at a high level by the Department of Industrial 
Policy and Promotion in the Indian government’s Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry.
25
 Accordingly, foreign investment restrictions are promulgated by 
the department in a series of periodically reviewed press notes, now released 
in periodically reviewed consolidated circulars. The restrictions constitute 
 
 
 24. PLANNING COMM’N OF INDIA, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SECTOR 
REFORMS: A HUNDRED SMALL STEPS, Sept. 12, 2008 (headed by Raghuram Rajan).  
 25. The Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP) was established in 1995 and 
reconstituted in 2000. Its primary role consists of ―facilitating investment and technology flows and 
monitoring industrial development‖ in India. See Roles and Functions of the Department of Industrial 
Policy and Promotion, http://dipp.nic.in/dippsub.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2011). 
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executive action and are enforceable, if at all, under the theory of promissory 
estoppel or legitimate expectations, unlike statutory law.
26
 The Department 
has periodically set out ―sectoral caps‖ for foreign investment in India,27 and 
certain types of investment, described in greater detail below, require the 
prior approval of the Foreign Investment Promotion Board (FIPB), a nodal 
government agency.  
In the second regulatory sphere, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), India’s 
central bank, regulates banks and all borrowing and lending activities.
28
 
Interestingly, the government’s foreign investment policy is also concretized 
in RBI guidelines.
29
 As established by statute in 1934, RBI regulations and 
guidelines have the status of secondary legislation.
30
 
In the third regulatory sphere, the Securities and Exchange Board of India 
(SEBI), established by statute in 1992, regulates the securities market and 
protects the interests of investors.
31
 SEBI regulations span takeovers, insider 
trading, raising capital, and more. SEBI regulations prescribe the manner in 
which listed company stock can be valued, and require the registration of 
foreign institutional investors. With respect to the steps required to 
consummate a hostile acquisition in India, the Indian regulatory landscape 
can be understood from two perspectives. The first and primary perspective 
consists predominantly of SEBI regulations, which serve as a blueprint for 
the takeover battle. The second and subsidiary perspective includes 
regulations that deal with matters incidental to the hostile acquisition such as 
finance and foreign investment. The latter may still play a large role in 
determining the vulnerability of Indian corporations to hostile takeovers. 
 
 
 26. However, the Reserve Bank of India, which has a statutory basis, periodically issues circulars 
and directions which mirror the Department’s circulars. For a discussion on the doctrine of legitimate 
expectations in India, see Punjab Commc’ns Ltd. v. Union of India, (1999) 4 S.C.C. 727.  
 27. For the current effective listing of sectoral caps, see DEP’T OF INDUS. POL’Y & PROMOTION, 
CONSOLIDATED FDI POLICY CIRCULAR 1 OF 2011 (effective Apr. 1, 2011), available at http://dipp.nic. 
in/Fdi_Circular/FDI_Circular_012011_31March2011.pdf [hereinafter CONSOLIDATED FDI POLICY]. 
For example, the sectoral cap for the insurance and print media sectors in India is presently 26%. Id. 
§§ 5.2.16, 5.2.20. 
 28. See Brochure Explaining RBI’s Role and Functions In Brief, RESERVE BANK OF INDIA, 
http://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/Publications/PDFs/RBI290410BC.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2011); 
Functions and Working, RESERVE BANK OF INDIA, http://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/Content/PDFs/ 
FUNCWWE080910.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2011).  
 29. RESERVE BANK OF INDIA, MASTER CIRCULAR NO. 02/2009-10, MASTER CIRCULAR ON 
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN INDIA (July 1, 2009), available at http://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/notification/ 
PDFs/22MCFDI90701_F.pdf.  
 30. Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934, No. 2, Acts of Parliament, 1934 (India), available at http:// 
rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/Publications/PDFs/RBIAM_230609.pdf.  
 31. The Securities and Exchange Board of India was established on April 12, 1992, as per the 
provisions of the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992, No. 15, Acts of Parliament, 1992 
(India), available at http://www.sebi.gov.in/acts/act15ac.html. About SEBI, SEC. & EXCH. BD. OF 
INDIA, http://www.sebi.gov.in/Index.jsp?contentDisp=AboutSEBI (last visited Mar. 31, 2011).  
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In FY 2009–2010, the Indian economy had attracted a total of about $19.8 
billion in foreign investments.
32
 The services sector accounts for 
approximately 22% of the more recent figure, while sectors such as computer 
software and hardware, telecommunications, real estate, and construction 
account for 7–9% each.33 On December 1, 2009, the FIPB had approved 
seventeen foreign investment proposals worth $984 million,
34
 even as 
another set of investments worth approximately $100 million were approved 
a few weeks later.
35
 Although India’s GDP had dipped from levels as high as 
9% in recent financial years to 6.7% in FY 2008–2009,36 the outlook on the 
Indian economy remains positive.
37
 Within the first forty-five days of 2010, 
deals totaling $14 billion had already been announced, surpassing the total 
value of all 2009 deals.
38
  
While the attractiveness of targets for strategic and financial buyers may 
vary based on their aspirations for the short-, medium-, and long-term 
futures, there appear to be no inherently unattractive features in Indian 
corporations which reduce their susceptibility to hostile takeover. However, 
exogenous factors may make the process of launching a hostile takeover less 
appealing. These may range from the cultural, historical, or political 
uniqueness of Indian businesses to visible and latent regulatory hurdles. 
However, the potency of these exogenous factors deserves to be analyzed 
and reassessed.  
 
 
 32. DEP’T OF INDUS. POLICY & PROMOTION, FACT SHEET ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: 
FROM AUGUST 1991 TO NOVEMBER 2009, available at http://dipp.nic.in/fdi_statistics/india_FDI_ 
November2009.pdf. 
 33. See FACT SHEET ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT FROM AUGUST 1991 TO NOVEMBER 
2009, supra note 32, at 2.  
 34. India Approves $984 mn of Foreign Investment Plans: Govt, ECON. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2009, 
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/foreign-trade/India-approves-984-mn-of-foreign-
investment-plans-Govt/articleshow/5288437.cms.  
 35. Foreign Investment Proposals Worth Rs. 524 Crore Approved, ECON. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2009, 
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/finance/Foreign-investment-proposals-worth-Rs 
524-cr-approved/articleshow/5397472.cms.  
 36. FIN. MINISTRY GOV’T OF INDIA, KEY FEATURES OF BUDGET 2009–2010, available at http:// 
indiabudget.nic.in/ub2009-10/bh/bh1.pdf. 
 37. Deeptha Rajkunmar, ―India’s Long-Term Growth Story Remains Intact,‖ ECON. TIMES, Apr. 
6, 2009, http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/opinion/interviews/Indias-long-term-growthstory-
remains-intact/articleshow/5755833.cms; Pallavi Mulay, Despite Economic Crisis, India Inc. Is 
Counting Its Blessings, ECON. TIMES, May 30, 2009, http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/article 
show/4595682.cms; Indian Economy Returning to Potential Growth Path: Goldman, ECON. TIMES, 
June 21, 2009, http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/News/Economy/Indicaters/Indian-economy-returns-
topotential-growth-path-Goldman/articleshow/4683272.cms; Anurag Joshi, Moody’s Ups Rupee Rating 
Outlook to Positive, REUTERS, Dec. 15, 2009, http://in.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-4472972009 
1215. 
 38. India Inc. Announces $14 Bn M&A Deals in Just 45 Days in 2010, ECON. TIMES, Feb. 16, 
2010, http://economictimes.indiatimes.come/news/news-by-company/corporate-trends/India-Inc-
announces-14-bn-MA-deals-in-just-45-days-in-2010/articleshow/5577824.cms.  
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A. Formidable Promoters and Cozy Relationships 
In addition to the historical and cultural reasons behind why Indian 
families that serve as promoters are hard to unseat in a hostile scenario, there 
is a significant legal factor explaining the entrenchment of promoter interests 
in Indian corporations. Namely, promoters are not required to subject their 
corporations to large public shareholding. Corporations that have 20 million 
or more shares outstanding and a market capitalization of Rs. 10 billion 
(approximately $217 million) are required to maintain a public shareholding 
of only 10%,
39
 while others must maintain 25% public shareholding.
40
 
Theoretically, promoters and those whose shareholding is aggregated with 
promoters (termed ―persons acting in concert‖41 with the promoters), can 
hold up to 75% in an Indian corporation.
42
 The Indian Takeover Code,
43
 
under the ―creeping acquisition‖ rule, permits promoters (or for that matter, 
anybody else) who hold 15% to 55% in a corporation to consolidate their 
holding by up to 5% each financial year, but it does not allow them to exceed 
55% voting rights post-acquisition without otherwise making a public 
announcement or setting off any of the triggers requiring a mandatory tender 
offer.
44
 Additionally, inter-se transfers within the promoter group are 
ordinarily exempt from the mandatory tender offer requirements of the 
Takeover Code.
45
  
Historically, it has been recognized that domestic financial institutions 
vote in concert with the promoters.
46
 These ―cozy relationships‖ between 
domestic financial institutions and industrial houses originate from the pre-
 
 
 39. BOMBAY STOCK EXCH., LISTING AGREEMENT, cl. 40A(iii).  
 40. Rule 19(2)(b) of the Securities (Contracts) Regulation Rules, 1957, read together with 
Regulation 41 of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Issue of Capital and Disclosure 
Requirements) Regulations, 2009 and Clause 40A of the Listing Agreement of the Bombay Stock 
Exchange. However, Rule 19(2)(b) was amended on June 4, 2010 by a Ministry of Finance 
Notification, by which: (i) only companies whose post issue capital calculated at offer price is more 
than Rs. 40,000 million (i.e. $868 million) can maintain public shareholding of 10%; (ii) such 
companies must raise their public shareholding levels up to 25%, by a minimum of 5% in any given 
year.  
 41. Securities and Exchange Board of India (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) 
Regulations, 1997, Gazette of India, section 2(1)(e) (Feb. 20, 1997) [hereinafter Takeover Code]. 
 42. Violating this rule for up to three months after the initial six-month offering period discussed 
in § 9.4 triggers compulsory delisting, and promoters may be required to acquire the securities of the 
remaining public shareholders at fair market value, subject to their option to remain shareholders in the 
corporation. Securities and Exchange Board of India (Delisting of Securities) Guidelines, 2003, 
Gazette of India, sections 9.4, 17.1, 17.2 (2003). 
 43. Takeover Code § 20A. 
 44. Id. § 11(1).  
 45. See id. § 3(1)(e). 
 46. Mathew, supra note 1, at 833–34. 
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liberalization ―license-permit-quota raj‖ in India.47 Firms granted a license to 
do business in India were almost guaranteed financial backing by state-run 
domestic financial institutions.
48
 Although the regulatory regime changed in 
1991, mindsets have not appeared to change in India, where it has been said 
that if Wall Street in New York was built by ―sharks,‖ Dalal Street in 
Mumbai was built by ―relationships.‖ Pooling agreements have been held 
enforceable by the Bombay High Court,
49
 and may facilitate such 
arrangements.  
In order to gain control over a corporation, a hostile acquirer would have 
to replace the majority of the corporation’s board of directors, or otherwise 
gain control over management.
50
 The steps to replacing the board are 
relatively straightforward and can begin as early as when the hostile acquirer 
achieves a 10% stake in a corporation. First, when the hostile acquirer 
achieves a 10% stake in the corporation, it can requisition the board to hold 
an extraordinary general meeting.
51
 Second, the hostile acquirer can seek to 
control the agenda of the meeting: an acquirer who has more than a 5% stake 
in the corporation can gain proxy access, as a result of which it can pitch a 
resolution to replace board members.
52
 Alternatively, if a general meeting is 
fast approaching, the hostile acquirer can take this step first, and seek to gain 
proxy access to set the hostile acquisition in motion. However, an application 
can be made by the incumbent board to seek to exclude shareholder 
proposals.
53
 Third, the hostile acquirer can replace the board with a 50.1% 
majority stake.
54
 The removal of directors and appointment of new directors 
 
 
 47. For a discussion on the extant license-permit-quota raj system, see infra notes 91, 92, 94 and 
accompanying text.  
 48. Tarun Khanna & Krishna Palepu, Globalization and Convergence in Corporate Governance: 
Evidence from Infosys and the Indian Software Industry, 35 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 484, 488 (2004).  
 49. Rolta India Ltd. v. Venire Indus. Ltd., (2000) 100 Comp. Cas. 19, ¶¶ 27, 30 (Bom.) (India). 
 50. The Takeover Code defines ―control‖ as  
the right to appoint the majority of the directors or to control the management or policy decisions 
exercisable by a person or persons acting individually or in concert, directly or indirectly, 
including by virtue of their shareholding or management rights or shareholders agreements or 
voting agreements or in any other manner.  
Takeover Code § 2(1)(c). 
 51. The Companies Act, 1956, No. 1, Acts of Parliament, 1956 (India), § 169(1). 
 52. The option is also available to 100 shareholders acting together. Id. § 188(2) (1956).  
 53. Id. § 188(5) (1956).  
 54. However, the single largest shareholder in a corporation, who holds a stake under 50% may, 
in certain circumstances, succeed in controlling the majority of directors on the board. Consider the 
following example: Company X has three substantial shareholders, A, B, and C, and the remaining 
stake is held by the public. Company X has 1000 shares, held in the following proportion: A: 400, B: 
100, C: 100, Public: 400. There is an informal arrangement between B and C, which they adhere to, to 
pool their votes together. Although Indian law presently requires companies to incorporate pooling 
agreements into the company’s articles in order for them to be enforced, I assume that B and C adhere 
to their agreement and do not wish to contest it. The board of Company X consists of ten members. 
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requires an ordinary resolution where the votes cast in favor of the resolution 
exceed the votes cast against.
55
 While the staggered board is a default 
structure
56
 in Indian company law—from which corporations may opt out, 
save in certain circumstances discussed later—all the directors can be 
removed without cause by ordinary resolution.
57
 After removing previous 
directors at a shareholder meeting, the hostile acquirer would require a 
simple majority to replace the directors.
58
 Consequently, assuming that 100% 
of the shareholders vote at the meeting, an acquirer would have to obtain 
50.1% of the votes in favor of its resolution to replace directors.  
Indian company law also makes the waging of a proxy war relatively 
hassle-free. The register of shareholders is open for inspection by any 
shareholder during ordinary business hours without the payment of a fee and 
to others with the payment of a fee.
59
 The register of members is required to 
maintain the name, address, and occupation of members,
60
 which makes it 
easier to contact them for proxy solicitation. Additionally, when an acquirer 
makes a tender offer to the shareholders of a target corporation, the board of 
                                                                                                                    
 
While it is theoretically possible for any shareholder to nominate a directorial candidate, such 
candidates may not have much of a chance on account of the limited resources of individual 
shareholders with minimal stakes. For the purpose of this hypothetical, I therefore assume that there 
are no stray directorial candidates nominated by individual shareholders. If the directors are voted into 
office by proportional representation, where each shareholder can only vote to the extent of its 
entitlement for each director, then no single shareholder would have a stake sufficient to nominate the 
majority on the board. For example, if A votes in favor of its candidates (i.e., a total of 400 votes per 
candidate), then assuming that B, C, and the public shareholders do not agree with the candidate 
choice of A, there would be a total of 600 votes against the resolution proposed by A. However, 
assuming that the public shareholder vote is splintered, if even 101 votes are cast in favor of A’s 
candidate (in addition to A’s own votes), A would succeed in controlling the board, which would be 
relatively easier for A to achieve as opposed to B or C, who would require 301 votes from the public in 
addition to their own 200 votes in order for their candidates to succeed. Similarly, assuming 
cumulative voting, where each shareholder can concentrate its votes on certain candidates, then A can 
concentrate its 400 votes in favor of six candidates, giving 66 votes to each of six candidates of its 
choice. Since B and C know that they cannot divide their 200 votes into six candidates and win, they 
would divide their votes between two to three directors so as to nominate the directors of their choice. 
Assuming that the public shareholder vote would be splintered, this would still place A at a distinct 
advantage as compared to B or C, to control board composition.  
 However, given that the distinct advantage available to the single largest shareholder whose stake 
is below 50% still theoretically leaves open the possibility that A would not succeed in controlling the 
majority of the board, this paper assumes that a hostile acquirer would succeed in controlling a 
corporation beyond doubt, by acquiring a 50.1% stake in the target, thereby placing itself beyond 
doubt in a position to appoint the majority of the board of directors.  
 55. The Companies Act, 1956, No. 1, Acts of Parliament, 1956 (India), § 189. 
 56. Id. § 255. 
 57. Id. § 284(1). 
 58. Section 189(1) of the Companies Act, 1956 defines an ordinary resolution as a resolution in 
which the number of votes cast in favor of a resolution exceeds those cast against a resolution. 
 59. Id. § 163(2). 
 60. Id. § 150(1)(a).  
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directors of the target is required under India’s Takeover Code to provide the 
acquirer with information regarding shareholders eligible to participate in the 
tender offer.
61
 
1. A BSE-200 Index Analysis 
The question which arises next is: is it factually possible for a hostile 
acquirer to acquire a 50.1% stake in an Indian corporation? The following 
results are the culmination of an investigation into the shareholding patterns 
of 200 corporations listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange and forming a part 
of the BSE-200 Index.
62
 The analysis revealed that 107 companies, 
representing 53.5% of the sample set, have promoters who hold stakes below 
50%, thus, in theory, permitting an ordinary resolution to replace their boards 
of directors. Moreover, taking into account the historical likelihood of 
domestic institutional investors (―DII‖) voting with promoters, if domestic 
institutional investors stakes are counted with promoter stakes, the study 
found that fifty-seven companies, representing 28.5% of the sample set, are 
vulnerable to hostile acquisition. Tables 1 and 2 present the conclusions of 
the study conducted, identifying those companies from the sample set where 
the promoter holding was under 50% (Table 2), and companies from the 
sample set where the combined promoter and domestic institutional investor 
holding was less than 50% (Table 1).  
However, at least three latent defense mechanisms additionally inhibit the 
hostile acquisition route in India. First, share transfer restrictions may impede 
the ability of acquirers to acquire shares from willing but contractually bound 
sellers. Second, pooling agreements may make it mandatory for some 
shareholders to vote with promoters to thwart the hostile acquisition attempt. 
These concerns are to some extent capable of being addressed. The 
enforceability of transfer restrictions in the context of public companies is 
tenuous. The Supreme Court of India has held that share transfer restrictions 
must be incorporated into the articles of a private corporation in order for 
them to be binding.
63
 However, as a result of conflicting High Court 
opinions, the interaction of this requirement with public corporations is not 
entirely clear.
64
 Further, this Article presumes that pooling agreements exist 
 
 
 61. Takeover Code § 23(2).  
 62. The complete analysis, listing out the shareholding patterns of all 200 corporations analyzed, 
is on file with the author and available upon request.  
 63. Rangaraj v. Gopalakrishnan, A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 453 (India); see also IL & FS Trust Co. v. 
Birla Perucchini Ltd., (2004) 121 Comp. Cas. 335 (Bom.) (India). 
 64. See Messer Holdings Ltd. v. Ruia, (2010) 159 Comp. Cas. 29 (Bom.) (India) (holding that 
preemptive rights are enforceable against public companies and that shareholders’ agreements need 
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predominantly between promoters and domestic institutional investors. As 
noted above, that still leaves 30% of the sample set presented in Table 1 
vulnerable to hostile takeover. In addition, pooling agreements would not 
restrict share transfers. Accordingly, if every institutional investor that 
acquires a stake in a corporation is required to sign a pooling agreement, that 
would not restrict the ability of the investor to exit the corporation and 
transfer its holding to the hostile acquirer.  
The third latent hurdle may be more problematic than the previous two. 
The shares of many corporations in India are presumed to be held by 
―friends‖ of promoters, who are not considered a part of the promoter group, 
but whose loyalties reside with promoters. Since information on friends is not 
publicly available, it would be hard to ascertain those corporations in which 
friends of promoters have defensive stakes. It remains to be seen, however, if 
a hostile acquirer can legitimately claim that sufficient shareholders did not 
tender shares on account of the existence of such friendships, which, if 
proved, would trigger penalties under Indian delisting guidelines. Further, the 
acquisition of Zandu Pharmaceutical Works by Emami in 2008 (described 
below), despite friendly ties between two groups of promoters within the 
target, exposes the vulnerability of Indian corporations to takeover once 
relationships collapse, even as the importance of blocking rights became 
apparent in the acquisition. 
It is important to note that the hostile acquirer who holds a mere 50.1% 
majority is still substantially constrained in the management of the 
corporation. Several matters require a ―special resolution,‖ where the votes 
for a resolution must be three times the votes against the resolution.
65
 
Important decisions, such as the alteration or amendment of the 
memorandum and articles of the corporation,
66
 reduction of share capital,
67
 
                                                                                                                    
 
not even be incorporated into the articles of association); W. Maharashtra Dev. Corp. Ltd. v. Bajaj 
Auto Ltd., (2010) 154 Comp. Cas. 593 (Bom.) (India) (holding that restrictions of transferability of 
shares, in this case a right of first offer or ―ROFO,‖ are not enforceable against a public company); 
Pushpa Katoch v. Manu Maharani Hotels Ltd., (2006) 131 Comp. Cas. 42 (Del.) (India); Mafatlal Ind. 
v. Gujarat Gas Co., (1999) 97 Comp. Cas. 301 (Guj.) (India); see also Karamsad Invs. Ltd. v. Nile 
Ltd., (2002) 108 Comp. Cas. 58 (A.P.) (India); Bombay Dyeing & Mfg. Co. v. Bajoria, (2001) 107 
Comp. Cas. 535 (C.L.B.) (India). Further, SEBI has reportedly taken the view that put/call options and 
rights of first refusal are unenforceable against public companies since they violate Indian securities 
law dealing with spot delivery contracts and derivatives contracts. SEBI apparently took this view in a 
confidential letter addressed to the Vedanta group (in the context of the Vedanta-Cairn deal) dated 
March 18, 2011, which was disclosed by the Vedanta group in a letter of offer dated April 2011 to 
public shareholders of Cairn India Limited. See Letter of Offer, filed by Cairn India Ltd. with SEBI, on 
Aug. 20, 2010, at 4, available at http://www.sebi.gov.in/takeover/cairnlof.pdf. 
 65. The Companies Act § 189(2)(c). 
 66. Id. §§ 17, 31.  
 67. Id. § 484.  
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voluntary winding up or liquidation,
68
 preferential allotment of shares as a 
means of raising capital,
69
 or even sanctioning of a merger or asset sale,
70
 
require a 75% majority in order to obtain the special resolution.  
Conversely, what this also means is that a hostile acquirer can throw a 
spanner in the works by acquiring a mere 25.1 percent stake in a corporation. 
A hostile acquirer who acquires a 25.1 percent stake in an Indian corporation 
has obtained de facto ―blocking rights‖ capable of being exercised against 
promoters.
71
 These rights can be used to negotiate with the promoters, either 
to acquire the promoters’ stake in the corporation or to sell out their own 
stakes to the promoters at a premium. The numbers in the BSE-200 Index 
analysis change dramatically when one measures the ability of a hostile 
acquirer to acquire a 25.1 percent stake in an Indian corporation. A total of 
173 out of 200 companies, representing 86.5% of the sample set analyzed, 
are corporations in which the promoters have stakes below 75%. And a total 
of 149 companies, representing 74.5% of the sample set, are corporations in 
which the combined stake of the promoters and domestic institutional 
investors is less than 75%. Looking at these figures, it becomes clear that 
blocking positions could potentially be taken by activist hedge funds, or 
institutions focusing on corporate governance issues, and that the blocking 
rights would result in sufficient leverage to be able to negotiate better 
corporate governance.  
TABLE 1: ALL CORPORATIONS FORMING A PART OF THE BSE-200 INDEX 
OF THE BOMBAY STOCK EXCHANGE, WHERE THE PROMOTER + DII 
HOLDING IS <50% 
Name of Company 
Promoter 
Holding 
Foreign 
Promoter 
Holding 
FII 
Holding 
DII 
Holding Other 
 
Sector 
ACC Ltd. 36.26 0.23 8.751 8.52 46.2 Cement 
Alston Projects India Ltd. 5.153 38.1 1.302 36.8 18.7 
Possibly power, 
(also railways) 
Ambuja Cements Ltd. 0.797 45.9 23.02 22.8 7.47 Cement 
Apollo Hospitals 
Enterprise Ltd. 35.68 0 26.4 2.29 35.6 
Cement 
Axis Bank Ltd. 38.34 30.4 8.297 8.3 22.9 
Banking – Private 
Sector 
 
 
 68. Id. § 100.  
 69. Id. § 81(1)(a).  
 70. Id. § 391 (read with § 394(a)-(b)).  
 71. In this context it is important to consider that under Indian law, even minority shareholders 
are capable of committing ―oppression,‖ (i.e., fiduciary duty breaches) concerns typically raised 
against majority shareholders.  
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Name of Company 
Promoter 
Holding 
Foreign 
Promoter 
Holding 
FII 
Holding 
DII 
Holding Other 
 
Sector 
Bajaj Auto Ltd. 45.8 0 15.19 7.08 31.9 Automotives 
Bharti Airtel Ltd. 43.62 21.6 17.71 3.86 13.2 Telecom 
Cipla Ltd. 16.92 20.2 15.88 4.36 42.6 
Drugs and 
Pharmaceuticals 
Cummins India Ltd. 2E-04 46.5 9.125 37.3 7.09 Technologies 
EIH Ltd. 37.62 0 2.701 11 48.7 Hotels 
Essar Oil 38.27 20 11.72 8.25 21.8 Petroleum 
Glenmark Pharmaceuticals 
Ltd 45.86 0 26.43 3.78 23.9 
Drugs and 
Pharmaceuticals 
Grasim Industries Ltd. 26.56 0 24.16 21.7 27.6 Textiles 
Great Eastern Shipping 
Company Ltd. 27.69 0 9.451 20.8 42.1 
Shipping 
GTL Ltd. 28.74 3.08 9.909 6.83 51.4 Telecom services 
Gujarat NRE Coke Ltd.  43.25 0 21.82 5.14 29.8 Coal 
HCL Technologies Ltd. 48.64 17.6 18.12 0.52 15.1 Technology 
HDFC Bank Ltd. 26.18 0 30.13 12.2 31.4 Private Banking 
Housing Development and 
Infrastructure Ltd. 41.32 0 22.22 2.34 34.1 
Construction 
Hero Honda Motors Ltd. 27.46 24.7 27.04 2.38 18.5 Automotive 
Infrastructure 
Development Finance Co 
Ltd. 19.53 0 42.51 22.4 15.6 
Leasing and 
Finance (NBFC) 
India Cements Ltd. 24.47 0 23.53 16.7 35.3 Cement 
Indiabulls Financial 
Services Ltd. 25.12 0 49.08 2.89 22.9 
Financial 
consultancy 
(NBFC) 
Indiabulls Real Estate Ltd. 16.88 0 68.06 3.78 11.3 Construction/SEZ 
Infosys Technologies Ltd. 19.23 0 42.07 9.43 29.3 Technology 
Ispat Industries Ltd.+ 16.55 20.6 4.738 15.8 42.3 Steel 
IVRCL Infrastructures and 
Projects Ltd. 8.852 0 52.81 12.1 26.2 
Construction 
 
Jain Irrigation Systems 
Ltd. 28.8 0 44.55 3.66 23 
Construction 
Jaiprakash Associates Ltd. 29.36 0 16.76 16.8 37.1 
Cement/Power/ 
construction 
Jet Airways (India) Ltd. 0.006 36 2.337 33.6 28.1 
Scheduled Air 
transport services 
Jindal Steel and Power 
Ltd. 38.21 5.86 16.2 10.3 29.4 
Steel 
JSW Steel Ltd. 26.3 1.91 19.55 17.6 34.6 Steel 
Jubilant Organosys Ltd. 15.98 3.03 20.48 17.5 43.1 
Drugs and 
Pharmaceuticals 
Lanco Infratech Ltd. 17.96 35.4 15.19 20.3 11.1 Construction 
Lupin Ltd. 34.65 0.01 12.65 12.6 40 
Drugs and 
Pharmaceuticals 
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Name of Company 
Promoter 
Holding 
Foreign 
Promoter 
Holding 
FII 
Holding 
DII 
Holding Other 
 
Sector 
Mahindra and Mahindra 
Ltd. 17.61 2.09 15.76 13.7 50.9 
Conglomerate 
Max India Ltd. 32.66 0 26.74 6.23 34.4 Conglomerate 
Moser Baer India Ltd. 10.18 0.08 16.57 16.5 56.7 Technology 
Nagarjuna Construction 
Co. Ltd. 18.71 0 32.63 20.4 28.3 
Construction 
Opto (Circuits) India Ltd. 13.52 3.56 20.21 16.6 46.1 
Technology 
oriented electronics 
Praj Industries Ltd. 19.76 0 7.533 9.63 63.1 Power 
Proctor and Gamble 
Hygience and Health Care 
Ltd. 1.044 37.6 1.128 36.5 23.8 
Drugs and 
Pharmaceuticals 
Punj Lloyd Ltd. 13.48 22 18.18 3.79 42.6 Power 
Rei Agro Ltd. 32.1 0 11.18 0.06 56.7 
Horticulture/ 
development of 
seeds 
Religare Enterprises Ltd. 45.95 0 2.914 2.91 48.2 Conglomerate 
Rolta India Ltd. 40.34 0 28.04 3.22 28.4 Conglomerate 
Shree Renuka Sugars Ltd. 20.58 0.45 18.16 17.7 43.1 Agriculture 
Shriram Transport Finance 
Co. Ltd. 38.55 0 20.51 5.8 35.1 
Finance (NBFC) 
Sintex Industries Ltd. 26.94 0 24.74 20 28.3 Power 
Sterling Biotech Ltd. 27 0 2.374 0.03 70.6 
Drugs and 
Pharmaceuticals 
Sterlite Industries (India) 
Ltd. 2.495 39.7 10.7 29 18.2 
Mining 
Unitech Ltd. 24.43 0.09 20.33 20.2 34.9 Construction 
United Phosphorous Ltd. 15.42 0.63 19.76 19.1 45.1 Seeds 
United Spirits Ltd. 32.49 0 33.49 9.49 24.5 
Alcohol distillation 
and brewing 
Welspun Gujarat Stahl 
Rohren Ltd. 28.06 6.17 12.88 6.71 46.2 
Engineering 
Yes Bank Ltd. 30.51 0 46.37 8.53 14.6 Private Banking 
Zee Entertainment 
Enterprises Ltd. 18.61 17.1 22.18 5.12 37 
Entertainment 
 
Notes: 
Of the 200 corporations analyzed in the BSE-200 Index, 57, representing 28.5% of the sample set, are 
companies in which the promoter stake and the DII stake combined is less than 50%. 
Sectors have been identified for the purposes of determining the vulnerability of these corporations to 
foreign (inbound) hostile takeover, based on foreign investment regulations discussed below. Based on 
foreign investment regulations, one finds that a total of 49 of 200 companies, representing 24.5% of the 
sample set, are vulnerable to foreign (inbound) hostile acquisition. 
For conglomerate sectors, issues under Press Note 2 (2009) and Press Note 4 (2009) (discussed 
below) may arise.  
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TABLE 2: ALL CORPORATIONS FORMING A PART OF THE BSE-200 
INDEX OF THE BOMBAY STOCK EXCHANGE, WHERE THE PROMOTER 
HOLDING IS <50% BUT THE PROMOTER + DII HOLDING IS >50% 
Name of Company 
Promoter 
Holding 
Foreign 
Promoter 
Holding 
FII 
Holding 
DII 
Holding Other 
 
Sector 
Tech Mahindra Ltd. 30.1 26.7 0.83 25.8 16.6 
Telecom Outsourcing/IT 
Infrastructure 
Torrent Power Ltd. 47.48 0 0.849 21.6 30.1 Power 
Voltas Ltd. 25.57 0 10.43 28.3 35.7 
Engineering 
Suzlon Energy Ltd. 49.75 0 14.2 7.3 28.7 
Power 
Tata Chemicals Ltd. 27.9 0 11.78 28.7 31.6 
Conglomerate 
Tata Motors Ltd. 46.4 0 12.85 20.5 20.2 
Automotive 
Tata Power Company 
Ltd. 32.66 0 19.21 29.1 19 
Power 
Tata Steel Ltd. 30.67 0 18.5 22.7 28.1 
Steel 
Tata Tea Ltd. 34.77 0 8.006 34.9 22.3 
Tea 
Reliance 
Infrastructure Ltd. 36.49 0 17.58 25.6 20.3 
Construction 
Crompton Greaves 
Ltd. 38.29 0 13.01 24.5 24.2 
Power 
Reliance Industries 
Ltd. 45.55 0 16.23 9.84 28.4 
Conglomerate 
PTC India Ltd. 15.29 0 21.98 40 22.7 
Power trading 
Oriental Bank of 
Commerce 49.45 0 10.66 27.5 12.4 
Public Sector Bank 
Pantaloon Retail 
(India) Ltd. 45.83 0 19.71 12.4 22.1 
Single Brand 
Petronet LNG Ltd. 48.46 0 10.07 2.58 38.9 Petroleum PSU 
Piramala Healthcare 
Ltd.  47.06 0 23.55 8.91 20.5 
Drugs and 
Pharmaceuticals 
Madras Cements Ltd. 38.02 0 3.015 18.2 40.7 
Cement 
ITC Ltd. 48.75 0 12.55 34.3 4.38 
Cigarettes 
LIC Housing Finance 
Ltd. 35.34 0 31.66 16.2 16.8 
Housing finance 
Kotak Mahindra Bank 
Ltd. 47.16 0 28.64 4.03 20.2 
Private banking 
Indian Hotels 
Company Ltd. 27.89 0 12.58 27.3 32.2 
Hotels 
India Infoline Ltd. 32.61 0 19.96 17.8 29.7 Financial Information 
IFCI Ltd. 39.95 0 11.36 36.2 12.5 
Financial consultancy 
(NBFC) 
Hindalco Industries 
Ltd. 37.63 0 17.41 19.7 25.2 
Mining 
Hindustan 
Construction Co Ltd. 37.56 0 24.34 14.8 23.3 
Construction 
Hindustan Petroleum 
Corporation Ltd. 49.26 0 9.139 27.9 13.7 
Petroleum – PSU 
ICICI Bank Ltd. 48.63 0 28.67 20.3 2.38 
Private Banking 
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Name of Company 
Promoter 
Holding 
Foreign 
Promoter 
Holding 
FII 
Holding 
DII 
Holding Other 
 
Sector 
Idea Cellular Ltd. 48.25 0 7.591 7.97 36.2 Telecom 
Housing 
Development Finance 
Corp Ltd. 44.88 0 30.25 24.2 0.7 
Construction 
Gujarat State Petronet 
Ltd. 35.63 0 11.89 24.2 28.2 
Petroleum (PSU)  
Exide Industries Ltd. 44.04 0 7.695 18.2 30.1 
Power 
Financial 
Technologies (India) 
Ltd. 44.38 0 23.37 7.64 24.6 
Technologies 
GlaxoSmithkline 
Consumer Healthcare 
Ltd. 39.87 0 7.362 21.9 30.8 
Drugs and 
Pharmaceuticals 
Divis Laboratories 
Ltd. 38.64 0.03 11.1 11.1 39.2 
Drugs and 
Pharmaceuticals 
Dr. Reddy's 
Laboratories Ltd. 28.71 0 25.92 22.8 22.5 
Drugs and 
Pharmaceuticals 
Educomp Solutions 
Ltd. 48.41 0 37.96 1.45 12.2 
Education 
Biocon Ltd. 39.18 19.8 4.151 15.7 21.2 
Drugs and 
Pharmaceuticals 
Century Textiles and 
Industries Ltd. 36.85 0 5.739 16.3 41.1 
Textiles 
CESC Ltd. 49.38 0 15.59 17.9 17.1 
Power 
Chambal Fertilizers 
and Chemicals Ltd. 45.86 0 4.763 9.24 40.1 
Agriculture 
Chennai Petroleum 
Corporation Ltd 49.37 14.7 4.676 9.98 21.3 
Petroleum PSU 
Colgate Palmolive 
India Ltd. 48.78 0 13.97 7.26 30 
Toothpaste 
Bajaj Holdings and 
Investments Ltd. 27.59 0 8.69 15.7 48.1 
Conglomerate 
Balrampur Chini 
Mills Ltd. 34.64 0 12.04 26.1 27.2 
Agriculture 
Bharat Forge Ltd. 40.26 0 10.74 16 33 
Manufacture 
Ashok Leyland Ltd. 43.36 0 12.35 23.5 20.8 
Automotives 
Asian Paints Ltd. 47.13 0 14.14 12.2 26.5 
Paints 
Aditya Birla Nuvo 
Ltd. 41.29 19.2 15.87 15.9 23.7 
Conglomerate 
Aban Offshore Ltd. 36.77 20.9 6.644 14.2 21.4 
Shipping 
 
Notes: 
Of the 200 corporations analyzed in the BSE-200 Index, 50 are companies where the promoter stakes 
are less than 50%, but where the promoter and DII stakes combined are greater than 50%. When this data 
is consolidated with the data in Table 1, one finds that a total of 107 companies, representing 53.5% of the 
sample set, are companies in which the promoter stake is less than 50%. 
Sectors have been identified for the purposes of determining the vulnerability of these corporations to 
foreign (inbound) hostile takeover, based on foreign investment regulations discussed below. Based on 
foreign investment regulations, one finds a total of 26 companies are vulnerable to hostile acquisition. 
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When this data is consolidated with the data in Table 1, one finds that a total of 86 of 200 companies, 
representing 43% of the sample set, are vulnerable to foreign (inbound) hostile acquisition.  
For conglomerate sectors, issues under Press Note 2 (2009) and Press Note 4 (2009) (discussed 
below) may arise. 
2. The Emami-Zandu Deal 
In 2008, Emami Ltd., a cosmetics products manufacturer, acquired a 
controlling stake in Zandu Pharmaceuticals Works, Ltd., an Ayurvedic 
pharmaceutical company, for a total price of Rs. 7.5 billion (approximately 
$150 million), after a hostile battle with the promoters of the target.
72
  
Zandu Pharmaceuticals, the target, was a listed corporation controlled by 
two promoter groups, the Vaidya and Parikh families. Emami, along with 
others ―acting in concert‖ with it, had acquired an initial stake of 14.81% in 
the target.
73
 In May 2008, consequent to conditional share purchase 
agreements with members of the Vaidya family, at a price of Rs. 6,900 
(approximately $138) per share,
74
 Emami contracted to acquire an additional 
10 to 11% in the target, which would increase its stake in Zandu 
Pharmaceuticals to 27.5%. The share purchase agreements were subject to 
compliance with the Takeover Code failing which the purchase would not 
take place. With an over 25% stake in the target, Emami would thereby 
succeed in gaining blocking rights in Zandu Pharmaceuticals. At this stage, 
even if Emami went no further and merely complied with its obligations 
under the Takeover Code, it would still have sufficient leverage in terms of 
its blocking rights to negotiate a deal with the board, with the aim of either 
selling its stake to the promoters or buying them out. When the Vaidya 
family initially appeared to have bailed out on its long-term partners, the 
Parikh family was suddenly left starkly vulnerable to the ―enemy at the gate.‖ 
The Parikh family, which owned an approximately 18% stake in the 
target, approached friends and members of the extended Vaidya family for 
the support of an additional 8–10% in the target.75 At the same time, the 
Parikh family started buying shares of the target on the open market. 
Consequently, by June of 2008, the price of Zandu Pharmaceuticals had 
 
 
 72. See Rumi Dutta, We May Buy Companies Overseas, ECON. TIMES, May 21, 2009, http:// 
economictimes.indiatimes.com/opinion/interviews/We-may-buy-companies-overseas-/articleshow/45578 
42.cms.  
 73. See Letter of Offer, filed by Emami Ltd. with SEBI, on June 13, 2008, available at http:// 
www.sebi.gov.in/takeover/zandupharmalof.pdf.  
 74. See id. 
 75. Battle Hots Up Over Controlling Stakes in Zandu Pharmaceutical, LIVEMINT.COM, June 24, 
2008, http://www.livemint.com/2008/06/24225815/Battle-hots-up-over-controllin.html.  
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already risen above Rs. 15,000 (approximately $314) per share,
76
 and prices 
continued to skyrocket during the ongoing takeover battle.
77
 As Emami 
sought to make the mandatory tender offer prescribed by India’s Takeover 
Code, the Parikh family challenged Emami’s advances before the Company 
Law Board, the Bombay High Court, and the Securities and Exchange Board 
of India.
78
 At this stage, if Emami’s tender offer were successfully subscribed 
to by shareholders, Emami would secure a 47.5% stake in the target.
79
 
Emami made an all-cash tender offer to the shareholders of the target on June 
2, 2008, for Rs. 7,315 (approximately $146) per share, revising its offer 
twice: first, on September 19, 2008, to Rs. 15,000 (approximately $300) per 
share,
80
 and then on October 3, 2008 to Rs. 16,500 (approximately $330).
81
 
The final offer price reflected a premium of 239% to the price paid by 
Emami to members of the Vaidya family, and a similar premium to the 
minimum price prescribed by the Takeover Code’s pricing guidelines.  
Eventually, following over four months of protracted negotiations, 
Emami bought the 18.18% stake of the Parikh family pursuant to a share 
purchase agreement dated October 15, 2008, for Rs. 2.2 billion 
(approximately $44 million), at a price of Rs. 15,000 (approximately $300) 
per share, and a non-compete fee of Rs. 220 million (approximately $4.4 
million)
82
 which, along with the tender of shares by shareholders consequent 
to the mandatory tender offer, put Emami in control of Zandu 
Pharmaceuticals
83
 with a 70.34% stake in the corporation.  
 
 
 76. Aveek Datta, Truce Talks Begin Between Zandu, Emami, LIVEMINT.COM, June 20, 2008, 
http://www.livemint.com/2008/06/20235055/Truce-talks--begin-between-Zan.html. 
 77. CLB Refers Zandu Issue Back To SEBI, BUS. STANDARD, Aug. 28, 2008, http://business-
standard.com/india/storypage.php?autono=332783.   
 78. CLB Reserves Order on Zandu-Emami Row, HINDU BUS. LINE, Aug. 21, 2008, http://www. 
thehindubusinessline.com/2008/08/21/stories/2008082152680100.htm; Sambit Saha, Emami Faces 
Open Offer Delay, TELEGRAPH, July 21, 2008, http://www.telegraphindia.com/1080721/jsp/business/ 
story_9578395.jsp. It seems that the Company Law Board passed an order dated July 28, 2008 
dismissing the case. Thereafter, on August 7, 2008, the Bombay High Court directed the Company 
Law Board to decide the application for interim relief. Finally, the Company Law Board passed an 
order dated August 20, 2008, by which it dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. See Corrigendum 
to the Public Announcement to the Equity Shareholders of the Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd., June 
2, 2008, available at http://www.sebi.gov.in/takeover/zanducorri.pdf. 
 79. To Get Control at Zandu, Emami May Offer a Premium to Parikhs, LIVEMINT.COM, June 2, 
2008, http://www.livemint.com/2008/06/01220710/To-get-control-at-Zandu-Emami.html.  
 80. See Corrigendum to the Public Announcement, supra note 78, cl. III.  
 81. See Post Offer Public Announcement for the Attention of Equity Shareholders of the Zandu 
Pharmaceuticals Works Limited, Nov. 3, 2008, available at http://www.sebi.gov.in/takeover/zandu 
post.pdf.  
 82. Zandu Sells Stake to Emami, FIN. EXPRESS, Oct. 17, 2008, http://www.financialexpress.com/ 
news/zandu-sells-stake-to-emami/374306.  
 83. Emami Acquires Controlling Stake in Zandu, HINDU BUS. LINE, Oct. 17, 2008, http://www. 
thehindubusinessline.in/2008/10/17/stories/2008101752470100.htm.  
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Emami’s acquisition of Zandu Pharmaceuticals exposes, in particular, the 
weaknesses of cozy relationships that have dominated Indian business in 
previous decades, underscoring the possibility that financial relationships in 
India do in fact sour, and that being best friends may not be the best defense. 
B. Early Warning Mechanisms 
Indian corporations may believe themselves to be invulnerable to hostile 
takeover because of the early warning mechanism which is built into India’s 
Takeover Code. Under the provisions of Regulation 7 of the Takeover Code, 
an acquirer must make a public disclosure within two days to the corporation 
and to the stock exchanges where its shares are listed when its holdings 
exceed the 5%, 10%, 14%, 54%, and 74% thresholds.
84
 While this may 
preempt a stealthy attempt to acquire control over a corporation, such early 
warning mechanisms are not unknown to systems which have been 
conducive to robust markets for corporate control.  
For example, section 13(d)(1) of the American Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 has not thwarted the hedge funds’ ―wolf pack‖ that takes positions of 
4.99% each in corporations.
85
 The primary difference between the American 
and Indian ―early warning‖ provisions lies in the time within which the 
disclosure must be made. The 1934 Act requires disclosure within ten days as 
opposed to two days under Indian takeover law.
86
 The American hostile 
acquirer accordingly benefits from ten days of permissible silence, within 
which time it can presumably do much more than an acquirer can do in two 
days in India.  
Of course, the hostile acquirer can make a hostile acquisition in India 
despite this provision. First, a nimble hostile acquirer may acquire up to 
14.9% of the shares of a corporation within two business days without having 
to make any disclosures. Next, by making a mandatory public offering for a 
minimum 20% of the voting rights of the company, as required by India’s 
Takeover Code, a hostile acquirer can severely diminish the capacity of the 
target’s board to adopt reactive defensive measures; Regulation 23 of the 
Indian Takeover Code provides that after a public announcement is made by 
an acquirer, the board cannot employ scorched earth tactics, enter into 
material contracts, or issue or allot any authorized but unissued securities 
 
 
 84. Securities and Exchange Board of India (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) 
Regulations, 1997, Gazette of India, section 7 (Feb. 20, 1997), available at http://www.sebi.gov.in/ 
acts/act15a.pdf.  
 85. See Laurie Smilan, David A. Becker & Dane A. Holbrook, Preventing “Wolf Pack” Attacks, 
NAT’L L.J., Nov. 20, 2006, available at http://www.lw.com/upload/pubContent/_pdf/pub1710_1.pdf. 
 86. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2010).  
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carrying voting rights during the offer period.
87
 Accordingly, the hostile 
acquirer that acquires a 14.9% stake in the target within two days can avoid 
the drawbacks of the early warning mechanism by making a public 
announcement to acquire an additional stake in the target on the second day.  
C. Acquisition Finance 
Several restrictions on acquisition finance make hostile acquisitions of 
Indian corporations seem unattractive. First, there exist several regulatory 
restrictions limiting the ability of an acquirer to tamper with the assets of the 
target, both within hostile and friendly contexts. In friendly deals, the 
leveraged buyout of a public company or its subsidiary using the assets of the 
target as collateral is prohibited by Indian company law. However, this 
restriction applies only to public companies and their subsidiaries, 
theoretically leaving open the possibility of taking a company private using 
this route.
88
 Within the hostile context, Indian takeover law prohibits the 
acquirer from selling, disposing of, or otherwise encumbering ―any 
substantial asset‖ of the target ―except with the prior approval of the 
shareholders,‖89 thereby limiting its ability to refinance its acquisition.90  
Second, the Reserve Bank of India, India’s central bank, heavily regulates 
the borrowing and lending of funds for acquisition purposes. The universe of 
Reserve Bank regulations can be analyzed using the following variables: the 
identity of the target, the identity of the acquirer, and the source of funds. 
Generally speaking, an Indian acquirer is severely restricted from obtaining 
either Indian or foreign funds for an acquisition, unless the target is a foreign 
corporation. While a foreign acquirer would be subject to similar restrictions 
for obtaining Indian funds to support Indian acquisition, foreign acquirers 
generally have wider access to foreign funds.
91
  
Under these rules, consider the following three hypothetical scenarios. In 
Scenario 1, both the target and the acquirer are domestic Indian corporations. 
Indian corporate houses are restricted in their use of both domestic and 
foreign funds in any attempt to acquire a hostile Indian target. Under the 
 
 
 87. Takeover Code § 23. 
 88. The Companies Act § 77(2). 
 89. Takeover Code §§ 16(ix), 22(18). 
 90. However, it is unclear if ―prior approval‖ would require a special resolution, or if it would 
suffice for the acquirer to obtain an ―ordinary resolution‖ to sell or encumber the target’s ―substantial 
asset,‖ which would arguably be easier in the post-acquisition scenario. 
 91. Needless to say, this applies equally to foreign targets, depending on the national regulation 
to which the corporation is subject.  
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Reserve Bank’s guidelines, popularly referred to as the ―ECB Guidelines,‖92 
Indian corporate houses cannot borrow funds from international banks or 
financial institutions for the purposes of acquiring a company, or any portion 
thereof, in India.
93
 There is, however, an exception under the ―approval 
route‖ in favor of financial institutions dealing exclusively with infrastructure 
or export finance.
94
 Indian domestic banks are prohibited from granting 
advances enabling the acquisition of shares, although an exception has been 
carved out for financing the acquisition of shares of infrastructure 
companies.
95
 Additionally, bank credit is prohibited to ―non banking finance 
companies‖ for investment in any company’s shares.96 
The ability of Indian domestic corporations and promoters to raise 
finances using share capital as collateral is also limited. The total available 
credit against share capital to any single individual is limited to Rs. 2 million 
(approximately $42,500).
97
 Further, an Indian domestic bank cannot hold 
shares in a company—whether as pledgee, mortgagee, or absolute owner—
exceeding 30% of the company.
98
  
In Scenario 2, the target is a foreign corporation and the acquirer is a 
domestic Indian corporation. Indian corporate houses can more easily obtain 
funds in order to acquire a hostile foreign target. Indeed, Indian companies 
have been given general permission to obtain funds from a domestic bank 
(authorized dealer) to participate in a bidding or tender offer process 
overseas,
99
 subject to ceilings. For example, the total financial commitment 
may not exceed 400% of the net worth of the Indian party as on the date of 
 
 
 92. RESERVE BANK OF INDIA, MASTER CIRCULAR NO. 07/2009-10, MASTER CIRCULAR ON 
EXTERNAL COMMERCIAL BORROWINGS AND TRADE CREDITS (July 1, 2009), available at http://rbi 
docs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/notification/PDFs/27ECB010709_F.pdf. 
 93. Id. pt. I(A)(vi), B(vi). 
 94. Id. pt. I(B)(vi) (read with pt. I(B)(i)(a)–(b)). 
 95. RESERVE BANK OF INDIA, MASTER CIRCULAR DBOD.NO.DIR.BC.90/13.07.05/1997-98, 
MASTER CIRCULAR ON BANK FINANCE AGAINST SHARES AND DEBENTURES (Aug. 28, 1998); 
RESERVE BANK OF INDIA, MASTER CIRCULAR DBOD NO.DIR.BC.17/13.03.00/2008-09, MASTER 
CIRCULAR–LOANS AND ADVANCES–STATUTORY AND OTHER RESTRICTIONS § 2.3.7.5(iv) (July 1, 
2009), available at http://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/notification/PDFs/69SR010709_F.pdf.  
 96. RESERVE BANK OF INDIA, MASTER CIRCULAR DBOD.BP.BC.NO.4/08.12.01/2008-09, 
MASTER CIRCULAR–BANK FINANCE TO NON-BANKING FINANCIAL COMPANIES (NBFCS) § 5.1(ii) 
(July 1, 2008), available at http://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/notification/PDFs/85374.pdf.  
 97. RESERVE BANK OF INDIA, MASTER CIRCULAR DBOD NO.DIR.BC.15/13.03.00/2009-10, 
MASTER CIRCULAR–EXPOSURE NORMS § 2.4.1 (July 1, 2009), available at http://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/ 
rdocs/notification/PDFs/71ME010709_F.pdf.  
 98. Id. § 2.3.2.1. 
 99. Foreign Exchange Management (Transfer or Issue of Any Foreign Security) (Amendment) 
Regulations, 2004, Gazette of India, section 14 (Nov. 19, 2004), available at http://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/ 
rdocs/notification/PDFs/60901.pdf [hereinafter FEMA Transfer Rules]; see also MASTER CIRCULAR–
EXPOSURE NORMS, supra note 92, § 2.4.13(a). 
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its last audited balance sheet.
100
 RBI approval is required in other cases.
101
 
Moreover, under the ECB Guidelines, overseas direct investment in joint 
ventures or wholly owned subsidiaries is permissible, although subject to 
existing guidelines on Indian direct investment in such ventures.
102
 For this 
purpose, a ―joint venture‖ is defined as a foreign entity in which an Indian 
party makes a direct investment.
103
 However, ―all-in-cost ceilings,‖ including 
interest and some other fees and expenses, presently stand at 300 basis points 
over six-month LIBOR for loans between three and five years and 500 basis 
points over six-month LIBOR for loans over five years.
104
 Generally, RBI 
guidelines do not apply where the acquisition takes place through the use of 
funds held in a Resident Foreign Currency account or through foreign 
currency resources outside India (in circumstances where the Indian acquirer 
is not ―permanently resident in India‖).105  
In Scenario 3,
106
 the target is an Indian corporation, and the acquirer is a 
foreign corporation. While foreign corporations may be subject to similar 
restrictions in obtaining funds from Indian banks, they would not be 
prohibited, under Indian regulations, from obtaining funds from foreign 
banks in order to carry out acquisitions in India, unless the national 
regulations to which the foreign bank is subject provide otherwise.  
Clearly, the avenues for domestic Indian corporations to obtain funding to 
finance domestic acquisitions are limited. However, this does not in any way 
limit the ability of foreign corporations to assume positions in Indian 
corporations using overseas financing opportunities. While the general 
collapse of the debt markets following the financial crisis may constitute an 
exogenous reason that has reduced hostile takeover activity generally, a 
subsequent upsurge in debt market activity might just spur inbound hostile 
 
 
 100. FEMA Transfer Rules § 6, as amended by Foreign Exchange Management (Transfer or Issue 
of Any Foreign Security) (Third Amendment) Regulations, 2007, Gazette of India, (Mar. 25, 2008), 
available at http://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/notification/PDFs/88452.pdf.  
 101. FEMA Transfer Rules § 9.  
 102. RESERVE BANK OF INDIA, MASTER CIRCULAR NO. 07/2009-10, MASTER CIRCULAR ON 
EXTERNAL COMMERCIAL BORROWINGS AND TRADE CREDITS pt. I(A)(v)(b) (July 1, 2009), available 
at http://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/notification/PDFs/27ECB010709_F.pdf. 
 103. FEMA Transfer Rules § 2(m).  
 104. MASTER CIRCULAR ON EXTERNAL COMMERCIAL BORROWINGS AND TRADE CREDITS, supra 
note 102, pt. I(A)(iv). 
 105. RESERVE BANK OF INDIA, MASTER CIRCULAR NO. 01/2009-10, MASTER CIRCULAR ON 
DIRECT INVESTMENT BY RESIDENTS IN JOINT VENTURE (JV)/WHOLLY OWNED SUBSIDIARY (WOS) 
ABROAD (July 1, 2009) § A.4, available at http://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/notification/PDFs/21DWR 
010709_FULL.pdf.  
 106. For the purposes of this paper, I ignore Scenario 4, where the target is a foreign corporation, 
and the acquirer is a foreign corporation, since the focus of this paper is the Indian market for 
corporate control. Scenario 2 has been discussed merely to highlight the contrast between the ability of 
Indian promoters to fund domestic acquisitions, and to fund foreign acquisitions.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
212 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 10:187 
 
 
 
 
activity in the future. Further, these restrictions do not apply to hostile 
acquisitions alone but also to friendly deals, which continue to take place 
despite these restrictions.  
D. Foreign Investment Restrictions 
Despite a productivity surge around the 1980s attributable to the Indian 
government’s pro-business (not pro-market) stance, India faced a severe 
balance of payments crisis in 1991.
107
 Until then, Indian economic policy 
was overwhelmingly punctuated by controls, tariffs, subsidies, and quotas. 
Against this backdrop, the Indian government negotiated loans from the 
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and donor countries, loans 
which entailed obligations.
108
 On August 27, 1991, the Finance Minister of 
India, Dr. Manmohan Singh, wrote a letter to the International Monetary 
Fund outlining the macroeconomic objectives of the Indian economy.
109
 
What followed was the New Economic Policy and endeavors to achieve 
fiscal stabilization and structural adjustment. Under the policy, the 
government undertook the following objectives: first, reducing the deficit in 
the central government’s budget by devaluing the rupee by 20% and 
changing the export-import policy by encouraging exports and containing 
imports; second, obtaining stand-by rights to $2.26 billion from the 
International Monetary Fund with the purported objective of restoring 
confidence in the Indian economy; third, seeking a budget with a better 
balance between revenue and expenditure; fourth, reforming the industrial 
licensing system; fifth, relaxing antitrust policy; and sixth, permitting foreign 
investment.
110
  
Foreign investment policy in India has periodically been liberalized, 
culminating in Press Note 4 (2006), in which almost all sectors were opened 
to foreign investment. Today, besides eight sectors in which foreign 
investment is prohibited in India (retail trading which is not single-brand 
product retailing, atomic energy, the lottery business, gambling and betting, 
the business of chit funds, nidhi companies, trade-in transferable 
 
 
 107. A.S. Bhalla, Sino-Indian Growth and Liberalization: A Survey, 42 ASIAN SURV. 419, 421 
(2002).  
 108. Ramashray Roy, India in 1992: Search for Safety, 33 ASIAN SURV. 119, 120 (1993).  
 109. Id. at 120–21. 
 110. See generally Arun Ghosh, New Economic Policy: A Review, 27 ECON. & POL’Y WKLY. 
1175 (1992).  
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development rights, and any sectors not open to private sector investment),
111
 
foreign investment is permitted either under the ―automatic route‖ or 
consequent to the prior approval of the Foreign Investment Promotion Board 
(FIPB) or the Reserve Bank of India. Under the automatic route, no prior 
approvals are required from any governmental entity or from the Reserve 
Bank of India, although there are some notification and filing obligations that 
must be carried out at the latter.
112
 However, there are two
113
 exceptions to 
the automatic route. First, prior government approval is required where more 
than 24% foreign equity is proposed to be inducted for the manufacture of 
items reserved for the small scale sector.
114
 Second, foreign investment in 
purely ―investing companies,‖ i.e., companies that conduct only monetary 
operations, requires prior government approval,
115
 even though their 
subsidiaries may be amenable to foreign investment under the automatic 
route.  
Significantly, when submitting an application to make an investment in a 
sector which is not automatic, a foreign investor is required to submit a board 
resolution passed by the target company,
116
 a resolution which would be 
impossible to obtain in the hostile context. In this manner, nationalist 
sentiment forms an invisible barrier to the hostile acquisition under the 
approval route.  
 
 
 111. See Press Note No. 7 (2008 Series), Dep’t of Indus. Policy & Promotion, Consolidated Policy 
on Foreign Direct Investment (June 16, 2008), available at http://siadipp.nic.in/policy/changes/pn7_ 
2008.pdf.  
 112. See CONSOLIDATED FDI POLICY; RESERVE BANK OF INDIA, NO. 13/2010-11, MASTER 
CIRCULAR ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN INDIA § I.18 (July 1, 2010), available at http://rbidocs.rbi.org. 
in/rdocs/notification/PDFs/13MFIN010710_F.pdf.  
 113. Prior to March 31, 2011, there were three exceptions. The third exception was that where the 
acquirer had an existing joint venture or technology transfer or trademark agreement as of January 12, 
2005, foreign investment in the ―same‖ field required government approval, except under certain 
circumstances. Press Note No. 1 (2005 Series), Dep’t of Indus. Policy & Promotion, Guidelines 
Pertaining to Approval of Foreign/Technical Collaborations (Jan. 12, 2005), available at http://siadipp. 
nic.in/policy/changes/pn1_2005.pdf. There were primarily three circumstances in which such 
investments required no approval: (1) investments to be made by Venture Capital Funds registered 
with the Securities and Exchange Board of India; (2) where the investment of either party in the 
existing joint venture was less than 3%; or (3) where the existing venture or collaboration was defunct 
or sick. This third exception has now been removed by the consolidated foreign direct investment 
circular dated March 31, 2011. CONSOLIDATED FDI POLICY at 88.  
 114. See CONSOLIDATED FDI POLICY § 5.2.4.  
 115. Press Note No. 4 (2009 Series), Dep’t of Indus. Policy & Promotion, Clarificatory Guidelines 
on Downstream Investment by Indian Companies (Feb. 25, 2009), § 4.2.3, available at http://siadipp. 
nic.in/policy/changes/pn4_2009.pdf. 
 116. See Check List for FIPB Plain Paper Application, Dep’t of Indus. Policy & Promotion, 
cl. 7(a)–(b), available at http://finmin.nic.in/fipbweb/fipb/fipb_index.html.  
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In the following paragraphs, foreign investment regulation in India is 
analyzed from three standpoints: general restrictions, restrictions specific to 
institutional investors, and restrictions under takeover regulations.  
There are several sectors of the Indian economy in which foreign 
investment is permissible under the automatic route where the foreign 
investor seeks to hold more than half of the domestic company’s holdings, 
which would make an Indian corporation amenable to the inbound hostile 
acquisition.
117
 Those sectors which are not amenable to foreign hostile 
acquisition are as follows: tea, certain mining activities, cigars and cigarettes, 
defense, asset reconstruction, broadcasting, commodity exchanges, courier 
services, credit information companies, insurance, investing in infrastructure 
or services, public sector petroleum companies, print media, 
telecommunications, trading, single-brand product retailing, and satellites.
118
 
These sectors are identified as being shielded from inbound hostile 
acquisition for one of two reasons: either the permissible foreign investment 
may be capped at less than 50% or the prior approval of the FIPB would be 
required, an approval which may be difficult to obtain given the possibility of 
nationalist sentiment arguments. This approval, as noted above, would be 
especially difficult to obtain in a hostile scenario, given that the FIPB 
presently requires a target board resolution prior to conferring approval.
119
 
Accordingly, the eight sectors identified above as ones in which no foreign 
investment is permissible at all can be thought of as invulnerable to the 
inbound hostile acquisition.
120
 
However, all other sectors are amenable to foreign investment in excess 
of 50% under the automatic route, theoretically leaving open the possibility 
of inbound hostile acquisition. Tables 1 and 2 set out those corporations 
which are amenable to hostile acquisition, based on the promoter or 
combined promoter and DII holdings, identified from a list of 200 companies 
listed on the BSE-200 Index. These tables identify the foreign investment 
sector under which these corporations would possibly be categorized.
121
 
Viewing foreign investment restrictions through the lens of the previous 
 
 
 117. The sectors amenable to foreign investment are set out in Press Note 7 (2008 Series), supra 
note 111. An analysis of the regulation, based on those sectors which are amenable to hostile 
acquisition and those that are not, is on file with the author, and available upon request.  
 118. See CONSOLIDATED FDI POLICY passim.  
 119. See supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
 120. In this context, it is important to note that the hostile foreign acquirer may also be an acquirer 
of Indian origin, as Indian policy does permit Non Resident Indians (NRIs) to invest in certain sectors 
where other foreign investment is not as easily permitted (e.g., scheduled air transport services).  
 121. It is assumed for sectors that do not fall under any identified category that foreign investment 
is permissible in such companies under the automatic route, consequent to page 10 of the latest 
consolidated foreign direct investment policy. Press Note 7 (2008 Series), supra note 111.  
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study conducted, one finds that a total of 86 out of 200 Indian companies 
(constituting 43% of the total sample set) are vulnerable to inbound hostile 
takeover, i.e. where foreign investment is permitted under the automatic 
route, based on the stakes of promoters being below 50%. On the other hand, 
a total of 49 companies (constituting 24.5% of the sample set) are vulnerable 
to foreign hostile acquisition based on the combined stake of promoters and 
domestic institutional investors being below 50%.  
Additionally, assuming that the policy of the FIPB becomes neutral 
toward the hostile acquirer, twenty-eight more sectors, which are presently 
shielded from hostile acquisition purely because any foreign acquisition in 
these sectors requires regulatory approval, would become vulnerable to 
hostile takeover. Further, in the telecommunications sectors, the FIPB’s 
approval is required beyond a certain percentage stake (49%), which leaves 
open the possibility of a collaborative effort between domestic and foreign 
hostile acquirers, although telecommunications companies are subject to 
antitrust and other regulations.
122
 In some sectors (e.g., telecommunications) 
foreign investment permissible under the automatic route may still be 
sufficient to obtain a 25.1% stake in the corporation, thereby gaining 
blocking rights and the consequent power to negotiate with the target board. 
Nonresidents of India are prohibited from investing or trading directly in 
securities listed on India’s stock exchanges.123 However, this broad rule has 
several exceptions. First, subsidiaries wholly or partially owned and 
controlled by foreigners can invest and trade on India’s stock exchanges 
since they would be considered ―resident‖ in India.124 Second, private 
 
 
 122. See Guidelines for Intra Service Merger of Cellular Mobile Telephone Service 
(CMTS)/Unified Access Services (UAS) Licenses, Apr. 22, 2008 (issued by the Department of 
Telecommunications).  
 123. CONSOLIDATED FDI POLICY § 3.1.  
 124. If the primary business of the subsidiary is investment, then it will be considered a ―non-
banking financial company‖ and be subject to relevant regulations, including minimum capitalization 
norms. See RESERVE BANK OF INDIA, NO.DFC.118/DG(SPT)-98, NON-BANKING FINANCIAL 
COMPANIES ACCEPTANCE OF PUBLIC DEPOSITS (RESERVE BANK) DIRECTIONS (Jan. 31, 1998), 
available at http://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/notification/PDFs/71239.pdf; RESERVE BANK OF INDIA, 
NO.DNBS.193/DG(VL)-2007, NON-BANKING FINANCIAL (NON-DEPOSIT ACCEPTING OR HOLDING) 
COMPANIES PRUDENTIAL NORMS (RESERVE BANK) DIRECTIONS, 2007 (Feb. 22, 2007), available at 
http://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/notification/PDFs/85290.pdf; RESERVE BANK OF INDIA, NO.DNBS. 
192/DG(VL)-2007, NON-BANKING FINANCIAL (DEPOSIT ACCEPTING OR HOLDING) COMPANIES 
PRUDENTIAL NORMS (RESERVE BANK) DIRECTIONS, 2007 (Feb. 22, 2007), available at http:// 
rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/content/PDFs/75943.pdf; RESERVE BANK OF INDIA, NO.DNBC.39/DG(H)-77, 
MISCELLANEOUS NON-BANKING COMPANIES (RESERVE BANK) DIRECTIONS, 1977 (June 20, 1977), 
available at http://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/Notification/PDFs/8MNBE010709_Full.pdf. Foreign 
investment rules regulating indirect and downstream investment will continue to apply. See 
CONSOLIDATED FDI POLICY § 4.1. If the subsidiary’s total assets are greater than Rs. 1 billion, then it 
would be treated as a ―systemically important core investment company.‖ See RESERVE BANK OF 
INDIA, RBI/2010-11/168, REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR CORE INVESTMENT COMPANIES pmbl. 
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arrangements negotiated outside of the context of the stock market between 
resident Indian shareholders and foreigners are permissible. Third, listed 
companies can issue stock to foreigners, for example, by way of a 
preferential allotment or rights issue (although this is highly unlikely in a 
hostile scenario). Fourth, non-resident Indians and SEBI-registered foreign 
institutional investors can purchase listed securities on the stock exchange 
directly.  
However, foreign institutional investors are prohibited from investing in 
more than 10% of the total issued capital of a company.
125
 The total 
shareholding of all foreign institutional investors put together cannot exceed 
24% unless the board passes a resolution, and a special resolution is 
passed.
126
 The combined power of these restrictions would not, however, 
thwart complex workarounds; for example, three foreign institutional 
investors with stakes each of 9.9%, 9.9%, and 5.1%, respectively may team 
up with a strategic foreign acquirer with a stake of 26.2%.  
Under the Takeover Code, the sale of shares by ―residents‖ to ―non-
residents‖ requires the approval of the Reserve Bank of India when the 
transaction would attract the provisions of the Takeover Code.
127
 When such 
transactions occur, though, the RBI may implement protectionist strategies if 
it so wishes.
128
 But this potential hurdle is easily overcome because under 
Indian foreign exchange law, a ―resident‖ includes a corporation 
incorporated or registered in India.
129
 Accordingly, a foreign hostile acquirer 
that incorporates a wholly owned subsidiary in India can trigger the 
provisions of Indian takeover law, without simultaneously conferring upon 
the RBI the authority to thwart its hostile acquisition attempt.
130
  
                                                                                                                    
 
(Aug. 12, 2010), available at http://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/Notification/PDFs/ICICNO97D130810. 
pdf.  
 125. Securities and Exchange Board of India (Foreign Institutional Investors) Regulations, 1995, 
Gazette of India, section 15(5)–(6) (Nov. 14, 1995), available at http://www.sebi.gov.in/acts/Foreign 
Institutional.html; RESERVE BANK OF INDIA, MASTER CIRCULAR NO. 02/2009-10, MASTER CIRCULAR 
ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN INDIA, pts. I, II(2)(i)(a) (July 1, 2009).  
 126. MASTER CIRCULAR ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN INDIA, supra note 125, pt. I § II cl. 2.  
 127. Id. pt. I, § I, cl. 22. 
 128. Id. 
 129. The Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999, No. 42, Acts of Parliament, 2000 (India), 
§ 2(v)(ii).  
 130. While such subsidiaries would be subject to the financing restrictions highlighted above, this 
would not prevent the foreign parent corporation from borrowing funds and lending these to the 
subsidiary. However, it is important to consider clause 5 of Press Note 4 (2009 Series), supra note 115, 
which provides that investment into shell companies that neither carry out operations or have 
downstream investments would require the approval of the Foreign Investment Promotion Board. 
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1. The Press Note 2 Defense 
Foreign investment restrictions can also help domestic companies to 
devise interesting defensive tactics to ward off hostile overtures by foreign 
acquirers, based on the Indian government’s Press Note 2 (2009). An 
investigation into the distinction between three categories of companies in 
India is instructive: operating, operating-cum-investing, and investing. For 
the purposes of this Article, an ―operating company‖ is a company with no 
subsidiaries/investments; an ―investing company‖ is a company with no 
operations, but only subsidiaries/investments; and an ―operating-cum-
investing company‖ is a company with both operations and 
subsidiaries/investments.  
Foreign investments comprised of pure investing or holding companies 
that have no operations would require prior government approval.
131
 
Accordingly, the foreign hostile acquisition of pure holding companies could 
possibly be thwarted by the nationalist sentiment of the FIPB. 
Pure operating companies that are conglomerates (i.e., companies with 
ingredients of business prohibited to foreign investment) pose an interesting 
dilemma to the foreign hostile acquirer.
132
 For example, when an operating 
company carries out operations in both power and atomic energy, foreign 
investment would be permissible in the power sector under the automatic 
route, but investment in the atomic energy sector would be prohibited.
133
 
Accordingly, such an operating company would be shielded from the foreign 
hostile takeover attempt.  
Operating-cum-investing companies similarly pose an interesting 
problem to the foreign acquirer. Investment exceeding 50% by a foreign 
investor in a holding company is considered an indirect investment in its 
subsidiary (to the full extent of the holding company’s investment in the 
subsidiary unless the subsidiary itself is wholly owned) and may therefore 
constitute a violation of FDI policy, without (or sometimes irrespective of) 
approval. Consider the following hypothetical: Company A, a foreign 
acquirer, invests 50.1% in Company B, an Indian holding company, which 
has a 90% stake in Company C, a company engaged in the gambling/lottery 
business, a sector prohibited to foreign investment. The 90% stake of 
Company B in Company C is considered indirect investment by the 
Company A in Company C, thereby exposing the Company A to breach of 
foreign investment policy. This would not have occurred had the foreign 
 
 
 131. Press Note 4 (2009 Series), supra note 115, § 4.2.3.  
 132. Id. § 4.2.1. 
 133. See CONSOLIDATED FDI POLICY § 5.2.6. 
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investment by Company A in Company B been less than 50%. Similarly, if 
Company B has a 100% stake in Company C, then the entire investment of 
Company A in Company B, 50.1%, is considered indirect investment in 
Company C. In this context, there is some uncertainty about what percentage 
stake in a corporation would be considered sufficient for a corporation to 
qualify as an operating-cum-investing company. For example, using the 
hypothetical above, if Company B had a mere 2% stake in Company C, it is 
uncertain if Company A’s investment in Company B would be prohibited.134  
In this manner, Indian companies which have diversified holdings or 
operations in sectors requiring government approval for foreign investment 
may be less vulnerable to foreign hostile acquisition, based on Press Note 
2.
135
  
2. The Cabinet Committee Defense and Antitrust Law 
Foreign investments exceeding Rs. 1200 crore (approximately $260 
million) require the approval of the Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs 
(CCEA).
136
 Therefore, all Indian companies that have a market capitalization 
in excess of $520 million, where a majority investment would exceed $260 
million, are additionally shielded from the foreign hostile acquisition by the 
potential nationalist sentiment of the CCEA. Big business would accordingly 
be shielded from hostile inbound acquisition by another layer of bureaucracy. 
The difficulties faced in the consummation of the friendly Vedanta-Cairn 
deal
137
 highlight how potent this defence could potentially be if a hostile 
acquirer were to approach the Cabinet Committee.  
 
 
 134. See FIPB Redefines Holding Companies–Sweeping Impact on India Inc., THE FIRM, http:// 
thefirm.moneycontrol.com/news_details.php?autono=350277 (last updated Sept. 15, 2008). 
 135. Press Note 2 (2009 Series) may prove to be a hurdle, enabling this defense. See Pramugdha 
Mamgain, L&T, EADS Defence JVs Hit Hurdle, ECON. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2009, http://economictimes. 
indiatimes.com/news/news-by-industry/indl-goods-/-svs/engineering/LT-EADS-defence-JVs-hit-hurdle 
/articleshow/4895294.cms.  
 136. Press Note 1 (2010 Series) § 3.1(a), Dep’t of Indus. Policy & Promotion, Mar. 25, 2010.  
 137. Vedanta Resources plc, Twin Star Energy Holdings Limited, and other ―persons acting in 
concert‖ sought to acquire 51% of the voting capital of Cairn India Limited, with the remaining 
10.63% stake of the promoters in Cairn India Limited subject to rights of first refusal in favor of the 
Vedanta group. However, on account of the sheer size of the investment proposed, and objections by a 
state-run entity (which was a partner of the target in its oil field business) to the present royalty 
arrangements, the deal has faced considerable bureaucratic obstacles. See Sanjay Dutta, ONGC Raises 
Bar, Vedanta to Miss Cairn India Takeover Date, TIMES OF INDIA, Jan. 30, 2011, http://articles.times 
ofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-01-30/india-business/28373771_1_cairn-vedanta-cairn-s-barmer-barmer-
fields; Garry White, Royalty Dispute Hits Vedanta-Cairn Deal, TELEGRAPH, Apr. 6, 2011, http://www. 
telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/industry/mining/8432801/Royalty-dispute-hits-Vedanta-Cairn-
deal.html; James Lamont & Amy Kazmin, Delhi Delays Cairn-Vedanta Deal, FINANCIAL TIMES, Apr. 
6, 2011, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/309ba64c-601d-11e0-abba-00144feab49a.html#axzz1NdtS6u91 
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India’s Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969, inspired by 
socialist era philosophies of the state acquiring the ―commanding heights‖ of 
the economy, sought to curb monopolies and big business.
138
 
Notwithstanding, it is widely believed that the command-and-control 
licensing regime had nurtured a few large businesses. Though the law was 
amended in 1991 to suit India’s liberalization outlook with changes that 
included the removal of merger controls, there was a sense that the regulatory 
mindset had not changed. In his budget speech on February 27, 1999, the 
Finance Minister of India, Yashwant Sinha stated that competition law in 
India had become ―obsolete‖ and that the focus had to shift from ―curbing 
monopolies to promoting competition.‖139 The resulting Competition Act of 
2002
140
 had not entirely been notified. However, its provisions dealing with 
mergers and acquisitions are proposed to be notified very soon by the 
government, such that they will come into force on June 1, 2011.
141
 
At present, Indian company law prohibits the acquisition of more than 
25% of a public corporation without prior central government approval 
(ordinarily conferred by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs),
142
 where either 
the acquirer is or the resulting entity would be a ―dominant undertaking.‖143 
A dominant undertaking would broadly include any entity that has a 25% 
market share.
144
 Such government approval would arguably be more difficult 
for the foreign hostile acquirer to obtain.  
Conversely, the new competition law of India, unenforceable for now, 
regulates ―combinations‖ of a certain size that would have an ―appreciable 
adverse effect‖ on competition in India.145 When the law comes into force, it 
would give the newly established antitrust regulator, the Competition 
                                                                                                                    
 
(available by subscription); GoM Refers Cairn-Vedanta Deal to CCEA, ECON. TIMES, May 27, 2011, 
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/news-by-industry/energy/oil-gas/gom-refers-cairn-vedanta-
deal-to-ccea/articleshow/8606687.cms.  
 138.  The Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969, No. 54, Acts of Parliament, 1969 
(India), § 2(d), available at http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/actsbills/pdf/The_Monopolies_and_ 
Restrictive_Trade_Practices_Act_1969.pdf. 
 139. Yashwant Sinha, Minister of Fin., Gov’t of India, Union Budget Speech of 1999–2000 (Feb. 
27, 1999). 
 140. The Competition Act, 2002, No. 12 of 2003, Gazette of India (Jan. 13, 2003); see Gireesh 
Chandra Prasad & Suchetana Ray, CCI Blessings To Be Must For M&As, Rejigs, ECON. TIMES, June 
8, 2009, http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/Economy/CCI-blessing-must-for-MAs-rejigs/articleshow/ 
4629250.cms.  
 141. Draft notifications have been submitted to the Ministry of Corporate Affairs of the 
Government of India. E.g., MINISTRY OF CORPORATE AFFAIRS, F.NO. 5/4/2003-IGC/CS (Mar. 4, 
2011).  
 142. The Companies Act § 108A. 
 143. Id. § 1086.  
 144. The Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act § 2(d). 
 145. The Competition Act §§ 5–6. 
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Commission of India (CCI), the authority to look into a variety of factors in 
order to determine whether a ―combination‖ is anti-competitive. Such factors 
include barriers to entry, extent to which substitutes are available in the 
market, market share, nature of vertical integration, level of ―combination‖ in 
the market, and others.
146
 Initially, the new law made notification voluntary, 
but pursuant to an amendment in 2007, notification is now mandatory.
147
 If 
the CCI has not passed any orders, a ―combination‖ comes into effect within 
210 days from the date of notice.
148
 However, the CCI would still be entitled 
to investigate ―combinations‖ within one year of their taking place.149 
Potential enforcement of the new law carries with it the hope that hostile 
acquisitions, especially inbound acquisitions involving foreign investment, 
might be somewhat facilitated. This is because the new law permits 
companies with a market share that exceeds 25% to go ahead with their 
acquisition, so long as their assets fall below the threshold or their 
acquisitions are not anti-competitive.
150
 
E. Other Invisible Barriers: Due Diligence and Litigation 
Finally, there may be other exogenous factors that contribute to the 
absence of hostile takeover activity in India. Consider that friendly deals are 
often concluded consequent to extensive financial and legal due diligence. 
Conversely, the information available to the hostile acquirer would be 
comparatively limited in India. While the target’s incorporation documents, 
audited financials, and litigation information may be publicly available, the 
hostile acquirer would still not be able to obtain third-party contracts 
(especially agreements with lenders)
151
 and employment agreements. These 
contracts or agreements could contain embedded takeover defenses—often in 
the form of penalties or severance packages—that are triggered upon a 
 
 
 146. Id. § 20(4). 
 147. Competition Amendment Act, 2007, No. 39 of 2007, Gazette of India, section 5(a) (Sept. 25, 
2007), available at http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry_hn/actsbills/pdf/Competition_Amendment_Act_ 
2007.pdf.  
 148. The Competition Act, 2002, No. 12 of 2003, Gazette of India, section 6(2)(a) (Jan. 14, 2003). 
 149. Id. § 20(1). Further, under § 31(11), where a prior application has been made to the 
Competition Commission of India, and the regulator does not respond within ninety days, the 
―combination‖ is deemed to have been accepted.  
 150. Although conversely, the law theoretically permits acquisitions that result in a market share 
of less than twenty-five percent to still fall within the scanner, since they may be viewed as anti-
competitive. However, the requirement of market share as an element in determining the anti-
competitiveness or otherwise of a combination may make this position less likely.  
 151. Shareholders’ agreements would not be required since they would be unenforceable under 
Indian law presently, since they must be incorporated into the articles of association of the corporation, 
which is a publicly available document.  
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change of control. Without advance knowledge, such measures would come 
as an unwelcome surprise to the acquirer. Indeed, the recent scandal 
involving Satyam Computer Services, Ltd., where the Indian outsourcing 
giant’s chairman, Ramalinga Raju, resigned after ―admitting to years of 
accounting malpractices,‖152 exposed corporate governance flaws in India, 
while underscoring the importance of financial and legal due diligence.  
Further, promoters often use the tool of litigation in India’s courts to 
construct hurdles for a hostile acquirer, which may act as substantial 
deterrents to risk-averse acquirers, especially in an inbound or foreign 
context where domestic promoters are more likely to be favored by domestic 
tribunals. Promoters have been known to petition tribunals and the SEBI to 
challenge an acquirer’s advances. While litigation in India risks souring a 
business relationship, the path of the hostile acquisition has generally been 
known to create litigation, and the hostile acquirer would therefore 
presumably proceed with the acquisition conscious of the risks of litigation. 
Finally, litigation in India can certainly be used as a tool to strengthen 
parties’ relative bargaining positions, and can also be used by the hostile 
acquirer. 
III. DEVISING A POISON PILL WITHIN INDIA’S RESTRICTIVE  
REGULATORY REGIME 
The poison pill has previously been ruled out in academic writings as 
precluded by regulatory restrictions in India,
153
 but is it possible to devise a 
takeover defense which mimics the crippling effects of a conventional flip-in 
poison pill? Simply said, a plain vanilla poison pill is a shark repellent 
defensive shareholder rights plan which gives rights to the shareholders of a 
corporation exclusive of the hostile acquirer and is exercisable upon the 
crossing of a threshold, or occurrence of a ―trigger event,‖ by the hostile 
acquirer.
154
 In the typical scenario, shareholders of a corporation are given a 
right (distributed by dividend) to purchase additional common or preferred 
stock in a corporation—a right which is at first financially unviable to 
 
 
 152. India Satyam Fraud Office Probe, BBC NEWS, Jan. 13, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ 
business/7826967.stm.  
 153. See, e.g., Mathew, supra note 1; Shroff, supra note 3; Rajiv K. Luthra, Can India Inc 
Swallow the “Poison Pill”, ECON. TIMES, May 19, 2008, http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/ 
opinion/view-point/can-india-inc-swallow-the-poison-pill/articleshow/3051566.cms.  
 154. Note, Protecting Shareholders Against Partial and Two-Tiered Takeovers: The “Poison 
Pill” Preferred, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1964, 1964–65 (1984). For a detailed investigation into poison pill 
mechanics, see William J. Carney & Leonard A. Silverstein, The Illusory Protections of the Poison 
Pill, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 179 (2003) and Guhan Subramanian, Bargaining in the Shadow of 
PeopleSoft’s (Defective) Poison Pill, 12 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 41 (2007).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
222 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 10:187 
 
 
 
 
exercise since the exercise price is too high, reflecting the ―long-term value‖ 
of the corporation.
155
 However, when a hostile acquirer’s stake in the target 
crosses a certain threshold, the pill triggers the rights plan by which all 
shareholders, to the exclusion of the acquirer, may exercise their rights at a 
discount to market price. In theory, the ensuing capital infusion makes it 
financially unviable for the acquirer to carry on with the acquisition. 
Although the pill’s defensive ability has been challenged in academic 
writings,
156
 the factual absence of a deliberate pill trigger speaks to its 
relative durability in the corporate control arena. Ever since the invalidation 
of the dead-hand version of the pill under Delaware law,
157
 the motive force 
of the poison pill has been to force acquirers to negotiate with the target’s 
board, which has the right to redeem the rights before the trigger event 
occurs.
158
 The flip-over poison pill gives target shareholders the right to 
acquire shares in the hostile acquirer, in the event that the acquirer attempts a 
merger following the acquisition.
159
 Since attempting a merger following the 
hostile acquisition would require a difficult 75% majority vote in the Indian 
context, this Article focuses primarily on the flip-in version of the pill. 
Strategies to work around the poison pill focus on waging a proxy contest to 
remove board members and to thereby revoke the pill.  
In the Indian environment in particular, three distinctive features of a 
typical flip-in poison pill are widely believed in the legal community as 
making the pill difficult to utilize. The first feature, and perhaps least 
significant hurdle, is that Indian company law prohibits non-cash dividends 
to be paid to shareholders (except as fully paid-up bonus shares),
160
 which 
rules out the distribution of exercisable defensive rights to shareholders in the 
conventional manner. What this also means, however, is that—unlike the 
issue of dividend, which is gratuitous and would typically require no 
protective disclosures or regulatory filings—a pill plan involving the issue of 
shares in India may entail copious filings with the SEBI.
161
  
 
 
 155. Anthony Augliera, Shareholder Rights Plans: Saying No to Inadequate Tender Offers, 57 
FORDHAM L. REV. 803, 808 (1989). 
 156. See, e.g., id.  
 157. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998); see also Omnicare Inc. v. 
NCS Healthcare, Inc., 2002 WL 31767892 (Del. Dec. 10, 2002).  
 158. See Subramanian, supra note 154.  
 159. R. Matthew Garms, Shareholder By-Law Amendments and the Poison Pill: The Market for 
Corporate Control and Economic Efficiency, 24 J. CORP. L. 433, 437 (1999).  
 160. The Companies Act § 205(3). 
 161. Securities and Exchange Board of India (Issue of Capital and Disclosure Requirements) 
Regulations, 2009, Gazette of India (Aug. 26, 2009), available at http://www.sebi.gov.in/guide/ 
sebiidcrreg.pdf [hereinafter ICDR Regulations].  
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The second and third features are perhaps more difficult hurdles to 
overcome. The second feature, a conventional plain vanilla poison pill, 
requires that the acquirer be excluded from the rights plan. The third feature 
requires the rights conferred by the poison pill plan to be exercisable by 
shareholders at a discount to market price. Excluding the hostile acquirer 
from the plan precipitously increases the acquirer’s costs of acquisition, since 
the equilibrium price that the market will require the acquirer to pay 
following the rights issue would typically be higher than the discounted price 
that the shareholders pay for the additional shares. The discount is key since 
it makes it financially viable for shareholders to exercise their rights under 
the poison pill plan. Ironically, this is designed to ensure that shareholders 
will not tender their shares to a hostile acquirer, as they anticipate making a 
tidier profit by exercising rights to purchase discounted shares consequent to 
a pill trigger, thereby preventing the pill trigger in the first place (unless the 
acquirer is prepared to pay a premium which meets the benefits of the 
discount). Indian regulation, it is widely believed, permits corporations to 
either exclude the acquirer or issue shares at a discount to all shareholders, 
but not to do both. This widely held belief is examined in greater detail 
below, where this Article seeks to establish that it is possible in the Indian 
corporate regulatory context to devise a poison pill plan that both excludes 
the acquirer and issues shares at a discount.  
A. Background: Relevant Takeover Code Provisions 
Any analysis of takeover defenses under Indian law must be prefaced by a 
brief summary of India’s takeover law. Under the complexly worded and 
often confusing body of regulations termed the Takeover Code,
162
 no 
acquirer can—either by itself or with others—acquire stock exceeding certain 
thresholds without making a mandatory offer to the shareholders of a 
corporation for a minimum of 20% of the stock so as to enable minority 
shareholders to exit and to partake of the control premium. Specifically, an 
acquirer that wants to cross the 15% threshold,
163
 buy 5% or more when its 
stake in a corporation is between 15% and 55%,
164
 or buy any stock at all 
when it holds between 55% and 75%,
165
 must make a public announcement 
in the manner prescribed by the Takeover Code to buy a minimum 20% of 
 
 
 162. Takeover Code § II(3)(11). 
 163. Takeover Code § 10. 
 164. Id. § 11(1). 
 165. Id. § 11(2).  
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the voting capital of the corporation.
166
 Acquiring control, i.e., the ability to 
appoint the majority of directors or to control management or policy 
decisions,
167
 also triggers the mandatory tender offer requirement.
168
 The 
hostile acquirer must factor this mandatory tender offer regime into its 
strategy when attempting any hostile acquisition.  
However, the Takeover Code also severely limits the universe of reactive 
defensive tactics that the target’s board can employ to defend the interests of 
the shareholders and the corporation (assuming that such interests are 
paramount) when a tender offer has been made by a hostile acquirer. The 
acquirer’s tender offer must remain open for a period of at least twenty 
days,
169
 during which the actions that a target board can take are limited; for 
instance, scorched earth tactics (such as selling off crown jewels) or white 
knight arrangements are prohibited.
170
 The target board is also prohibited 
during this time from issuing any authorized but unissued shares.
171
 
However, in a narrow exception under the Takeover Code, the target board is 
not prohibited from issuing or allotting shares pursuant to a ―rights issue‖ in 
―respect of which the offer document has already been filed with the 
Registrar of Companies or Stock Exchanges,‖ or shares ―upon exercise of 
options against warrants.‖172  
Of course, the target board is not prohibited from issuing shares or 
adopting defensive measures when the acquirer crosses any threshold below 
15%, i.e., before the acquirer makes a mandatory tender offer. In fact, the 
acquirer must inform the target every time it crosses certain thresholds: 5%, 
10%, 14%, 54%, and 74%.
173
 Accordingly, the target board could wait for an 
acquirer to announce that it has, say, 14% and then issue shares to 
shareholders under a pill plan. However, as elaborated before, the acquirer 
would have a two-day period of silence within which it has to make these 
disclosures. An agile acquirer could theoretically acquire 14.9% (whether by 
itself or in concert with others in order to avoid suspicion) and make a public 
announcement within two days, thereby freezing the board’s ability to adopt 
defensive measures reactively. Therefore, the target board’s most reliable 
defense would be one which operates during the mandatory tender offer 
period.  
 
 
 166. Id. § 21(1).  
 167. Id. § 2(c).  
 168. Id. § 12.  
 169. Takeover Code § 22(5).  
 170. Id. § 23(1)(a).  
 171. Id. § 23.  
 172. Id. § 23(1), Explanation.  
 173. Id. § 7.  
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A poison pill plan in India can either seek to issue discounted shares to all 
shareholders (excluding the hostile acquirer) pursuant to a rights issue where 
the offer document has already been filed, or it can give shareholders the 
option to convert previously issued rights (termed ―warrants‖) in the event 
that an acquirer crosses a threshold. The difficulties with both of these 
approaches are analyzed and addressed below. 
B. The Tenuous Ex-Post Share Warrant Defense 
Indian corporations may raise capital using primarily three methods: (1) a 
public issue, (2) a rights issue,
174
 or (3) a private placement. A public issue 
may take the form of either an initial public offering (for unlisted 
corporations) or a further public offering (for listed corporations). A private 
placement may take the form of a preferential allotment of shares to strategic 
buyers or a qualified institutions placement to institutional buyers. For the 
purpose of devising a poison pill, the public issue route would not work 
because of the obvious ability of the hostile acquirer to participate in the 
issue. Furthermore, a corporation which seeks to raise equity capital from 
outsiders would require the approval of a special majority of its 
shareholders,
175
 which may be difficult to obtain.  
The board of directors of a corporation may use the private 
placement/preferential allotment route to issue shares to some shareholders 
(or to anybody else) to the exclusion of other shareholders, a mechanism that 
could be used in a defensive rights plan to exclude the hostile acquirer. 
However, shares so issued are required to be issued at a price prescribed by 
regulatory guidelines, which would make exercise of the right expensive and 
therefore ineffective as a defensive tactic, unless issued to those willing to 
pay the price to defend the corporation, e.g., the promoters. Like a public 
issue, a preferential allotment would again require a special resolution of 
shareholders, which could be difficult to obtain, considering that poison pills 
have typically been equated with board entrenchment interests.
176
  
Indian company law permits public corporations with the prior approval 
of the central government to issue share warrants to shareholders, entitling 
the warrant holders to a prescribed number of equity shares.
177
 In fact, the 
promoters of many Indian corporations hold share warrants, and 
consequently, offers under the Takeover Code are sometimes made 
 
 
 174. The Companies Act § 81. 
 175. The Companies Act § 81(A). 
 176. See Garms, supra note 159.  
 177. The Companies Act § 114. 
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contingent upon the warrants not being exercised.
178
 However, share 
warrants have limited defensive abilities. Indian securities law prohibits 
companies to be listed if there are outstanding rights (including warrants) 
entitling holders to receive equity.
179
 For this reason, warrants cannot be 
issued before the company is listed (but they can be issued after the company 
goes public)
180
 when the promoters would presumably have greater control 
over the corporation, and share warrants would not be subject to pricing 
guidelines.  
Issuing warrants after the corporation is listed entails various 
difficulties.
181
 First, since warrants are issued on a preferential basis to some 
shareholders over others, they require special resolutions of shareholders to 
be passed, which may be difficult for listed entities where promoters and 
their affiliates have stakes substantially below 75%. Second, warrants issued 
for listed entities are subject to pricing guidelines,
182
 although such warrant 
holders are required under Indian law to pay only 25% of the price of the 
warrants at the outset and can pay the remaining 75% at the time of 
exercise.
183
 Although this exercise price may amount to a discount under the 
market price as time goes by, the fact that warrants can lapse if not exercised 
within a relatively short, prescribed period of time—usually eighteen 
months—limits the discount that this bifurcation would otherwise have 
achieved for the promoters. Third, this avenue would require additional 
promoter investment, which may be substantial, unlike a poison pill, where 
the costs of the defensive shark repellent mechanism are shared among the 
shareholders. The warrants would have to be issued to promoters alone since 
the absence of a discount due to pricing guidelines would make it unlikely 
that ordinary shareholders would exercise their options and convert the 
warrants to stock. Fourth, the warrants so issued are subject to timing 
restrictions. The allotment of specified securities must be completed within 
 
 
 178. See Post Offer Public Announcement by Allsec Technologies Ltd., Jan. 12, 2007, available 
at http://www.sebdi.gov.in/takeover/allsecpostoffer.pdf.  
 179. Securities and Exchange Board of India (Issue of Capital and Disclosure Requirements) 
(Fourth Amendment) Regulations, 2009, Gazette of India, section 26(5) [hereinafter Disclosure 
Requirements], available at http://www.sebi.gov.in/guide/sebiidcrreg.pdf (Aug. 26, 2009).  
 180. A ―public company‖ under Indian company law is a company that: (i) does not restrict rights 
to transfer shares; (ii) does not limit its members to fifty; (iii) does not prohibit invitation to the public 
to subscribe for its shares or debentures; and (iv) has a minimum paid up capital of Rs. 50 million 
(approximately $1 million). A private company which is a subsidiary of a public company also counts. 
See The Companies Act § 3(1)(iii)–(iv). 
 181. These difficulties would also largely apply to other convertible securities such as optionally 
convertible preferred shares which can convert to equity at the company’s option.  
 182. Disclosure Requirements § 76.  
 183. Id. § 77(2).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol10/iss2/2
  
 
 
 
 
2011] SHARK REPELLENTS IN INDIA 227 
 
 
 
 
fifteen days of the special resolution,
184
 and the tenure of convertible 
securities cannot exceed eighteen months from the date of allotment.
185
 The 
possibility of obtaining repeated special resolutions every eighteen months 
may make the defensive process more difficult. 
C. The Rights Issue Pill 
A rights issue is an issue of shares to the existing shareholders of the 
corporation in proportion to their respective stakes in the corporation. The 
rights issue route does not require either a shareholder vote or a special 
resolution, and it can be affected by board resolution. However, considering 
that the benefits of a rights issue must accrue to every shareholder of the 
corporation, including a possible hostile acquirer, the exclusion of the hostile 
acquirer from a rights issue-based poison pill plan would have to be 
explored. It is argued below that, despite the inability of the board to 
completely exclude the hostile acquirer from participating in a rights issue, it 
is certainly possible to partially exclude the acquirer in a manner conducive 
to the purposes of a conventional poison pill.  
1. Excluding the Acquirer: The Record Date 
Procedurally, the rights issue is governed by the provisions of the Issue of 
Capital and Disclosure Requirements Regulations of 2009 (―ICDR 
Regulations‖) recently issued by the SEBI, and the Listing Agreement that a 
corporation enters into with a stock exchange. In order for a rights issue to be 
permissible, at least 90% of the shares issued must be subscribed.
186
 It is 
unclear if an offer by existing shareholders to subscribe to the unsubscribed 
portion of the rights issue, thereby exceeding their own entitlements, would 
satisfy the 90% requirement. Shares so issued can typically be issued at a 
discount to market price.  
A rights issue involves several steps,
187
 which a corporation must 
undertake in order to consummate the offering, including, but not limited to, 
filing the offer document with SEBI and the stock exchange, declaring a 
record date, and sending the offer document to the shareholders. These steps 
can be divided into three categories. First, a corporation may be required to 
undertake several standalone steps, which may be carried out only once. 
 
 
 184. Id. § 74(2).  
 185. Id. § 75. 
 186. ICDR Regulations sched. VIII, pt. D, § XVII(B). 
 187. A rights issue requires the completion of a total of thirty-six steps, which have been 
identified by the author, and are available upon request.  
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Notifying the exchange of a board meeting is an example of such a 
requirement.
188
 Second, a corporation may be required to complete several 
time-triggering steps, e.g., filing documents with regulatory authorities such 
as SEBI or the stock exchange. These time-triggering steps commence a time 
period within which the rights issue must be consummated. Third, 
corporations are required to engage in rights issue-consummating steps, e.g., 
declaring a record date or issuing letters of offer.
189
  
For an Indian corporation wishing to use the rights issue route as a shark 
repellent defensive tactic, the second of these steps is the most problematic. 
Though the standalone steps can be accomplished easily, and the rights issue-
consummating steps may not arise until the pill’s triggering event has 
occurred, the time-triggering steps may need to be performed by the 
corporation at periodic intervals. The most significant time-triggering step is 
the filing of the draft offer document with SEBI. Following this filing, a 
corporation has either three months to carry out the rights issue or twelve 
months of any observations issued by SEBI if such observations are 
issued.
190
 Consequently, in order for a corporation to set up a rights issue-
based poison pill, it would have to either periodically file the required 
documents with SEBI or renew its previous filings with SEBI. The offer 
document must state that the offer is conditional upon the occurrence of a 
triggering event, such as an acquirer crossing a threshold stake.
191
 Such 
filings would entail unavoidable agency and transaction costs, since the 
Takeover Code prohibits the issuance of securities (including those under a 
potential poison pill plan) unless documents have been filed with the 
Registrar of Companies or the stock exchange.
192
 The ICDR Regulations 
provide that the filings made with the stock exchange must be preceded by a 
filing with SEBI.
193
 Although the ICDR Regulations permit SEBI to relax the 
strict enforcement of regulations that appear to be procedural in nature,
194
 
there appears to be no reason to believe that SEBI would relax the filing 
requirement for each successive offer document filed in the context of a 
defensive rights issue.  
 
 
 188. Sec. & Exch. Bd. of India, Listing Agreement for Securitized Debt Instruments Cir./IMD/DF/ 
5/2011 cl. 13(h) (Mar. 16, 2011).  
 189. ICDR Regulations §§ 52, 54. 
 190. ICDR Regulations § 11(1). 
 191. The offer document is required to contain all ―material disclosures‖ that are ―true and 
adequate‖ in order to ―enable the applicants to take an informed investment decision.‖ ICDR 
Regulations § 57(1).  
 192. Takeover Code § 23(1)(c)(ii). 
 193. ICDR Regulations § 4(1). 
 194. Disclosure Requirements § 109(a).  
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Tracking the steps delineated by Indian regulation surrounding the rights 
issue, would it be possible for a corporation to exclude a hostile acquirer 
from participating in a rights issue? After all, it is the board’s prerogative to 
determine the record date by which the eligibility of shareholders to 
participate in the rights issue will be determined, and all shareholders of a 
corporation on that date are entitled to participate in a rights issue. While it 
may be clear that a record date cannot go as far back as a decade, it may be 
legitimate for the board of directors of a corporation to declare, consequent to 
a hostile tender offer, that the date on which the hostile acquirer makes the 
voluntary tender offer under the Takeover Code is the record date for the 
purposes of the rights issue. In this manner, the hostile acquirer would be 
preempted from exercising any rights issued to shareholders who tender their 
shares, although it would still be able to participate in the rights issue to the 
extent of its preexisting stake.  
As an alternative to giving directors the authority to subsequently declare 
a record date, which may then weaken their bargaining position by virtue of 
the fact that they would have the last look on the pill’s devastating 
consequences,
195
 the record date could also be stated in the offer document 
filed with SEBI and the stock exchange as the date on which any triggering 
event occurs. Under this approach, the pill becomes irrevocable in the event 
that the threshold is crossed, thus sharpening its defensive effectiveness. This 
approach would have to balance competing interests between ensuring that 
the pill becomes irrevocable upon the hostile crossing of a threshold and 
giving the directors the authority to carve out exemptions for friendly deals. 
One possible solution would be to define a triggering event in the offer 
document as excluding a tender offer or other acquisition consequent to a 
―Memorandum of Understanding‖ or other agreement executed by the target 
board. This exception would not cover ex ante agreements executed by the 
target board, and accordingly, they would be able to maintain a strong 
bargaining hand, because a hostile acquirer would require the prior approval 
of the target board in order to avoid the poison pill trigger.  
2. The Indian Poison Pill in Motion 
The board of directors of a corporation may adopt a poison pill in the 
following manner: first, comply with the previously highlighted standalone 
steps; and second, periodically pursue time-triggering steps, (i.e., make all 
filings with the pertinent regulatory authorities). It is important to note that 
 
 
 195. See Subramanian, supra note 154 (arguing that PeopleSoft’s poison pill was defective 
because it gave its directors the ―last look‖).  
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penalties for withdrawing the issue only arise once a record date has been 
declared,
196
 and the board can then decide not to go through with the rights 
issue, which thereby ensures that the board has leverage in its negotiations 
with the hostile acquirer. The dynamics of the poison pill devised using the 
rights issue route are analyzed in the hypothetical below.  
Company B is a domestically listed Indian corporation, amenable to 
foreign investment up to 100% under the automatic route, and one in which 
the promoters’ and domestic institutional investors’ stake is less than 30%. 
The board of directors of Company B has issued a board resolution 
authorizing a rights issue, and has completed all standalone rights issue steps. 
It also periodically makes its time-triggering filings in a timely manner. 
Either no record date has ever been declared for a rights issue or the record 
date is the date on which any potential triggering event occurs. The total 
number of outstanding shares of Company B is 1 billion, and the market 
price of each share is Rs. 200. The market capitalization of Company B is Rs. 
200 billion. Under the proposed rights issue, a total of one billion shares 
would be issued to all eligible shareholders at a discount of 12.5 percent to 
the market price upon the occurrence of a trigger event. The trigger event is 
defined as the making of a mandatory tender offer by an acquirer, which, 
upon completion, would result in the acquirer owning more than 15% stock 
in the corporation.  
Company A, a foreign hostile acquirer, assumes a 14.9% stake in 
Company B. Desirous of crossing the 15% threshold, Company A makes a 
tender offer conditioned on a minimum level of acceptance of 35.2% of the 
shares
197
 of Company B on January 15, 2011, thus complying with and 
exceeding the minimum requirements (i.e., making an offer for a minimum 
20%) of the Takeover Code. If all shares are tendered, Company A would 
obtain a 50.1% stake in Company B.  
In order for the board of Company B to defend the corporation from 
Company A’s hostile overtures, directors of Company B would have to 
declare a record date, assuming that all other documents have been filed with 
the appropriate authorities. Accordingly, the board of Company B would 
declare January 15, 2011, the date on which Company A made the tender 
offer, or any date before then to be the record date. Alternatively, if the 
record date has been described in the offer document as the date on which the 
trigger event occurs, then the same result would be achieved.  
 
 
 196. Disclosure Requirements § 52(3).  
 197. Section 21A of the Takeover Code permits offers which are conditioned on a minimum level 
of acceptance, which ―may be less than 20%.‖ 
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The simplified schematics below accompany an analysis of the costs of 
acquisition to the hostile acquirer if the pill were not in place and if the pill 
were in place: 
Scenario 1: No Poison Pill 
Number of Shares Outstanding: 1 billion 
Market Capitalization: Rs. 200 billion 
Market Price of Each Share: Rs. 200 
Total Cost of Acquisition: Rs. 100 billion 
Scenario 2: Poison Pill 
Number of Shares Outstanding: 1 billion 
Number of Shares Outstanding Consequent to Rights Issue: 2 billion 
Share Price: Rs. 187.50 
Market Capitalization: Rs. 375 billion 
Price Paid Per Share for 14.9%: Rs. 200 
Price Paid Per Share to Retain 14.9% in Rights Issue: Rs. 175  
Price Paid Per Share for Remaining 35.2%: Rs. 187.50 
Total Cost of Acquisition: Rs. 187.5 billion 
In Scenario 1, in order to acquire a 50.1% stake in Company B, Company 
A would have to pay Rs. 200 for each of 501 shares, amounting to a little 
over Rs. 100 billion. The total cost of acquisition would therefore be Rs. 100 
billion. Assuming that Company A would have to pay a premium of Rs. 15 
per share to the tendering shareholders of Company B, the total cost of 
acquisition would be Rs. 107.5 billion. 
In Scenario 2, Company A acquires a 14.9% stake in the corporation 
before the poison pill is triggered. Accordingly, Company A would pay Rs. 
200 for each of 149 million shares, amounting to a little under Rs. 30 billion. 
Thereafter, upon the pill being triggered, Company A would be entitled to 
participate in the rights issue to the extent of 14.9% but not to the extent of 
the shares tendered to it in the tender offer due to the record date. In order to 
maintain its 14.9% stake in Company B, Company A would have to pay a 
sum of Rs. 175 (reflecting a discount of 12.5% to the market price) for each 
of 149 million shares, amounting to a little under Rs. 26.25 billion. Since the 
total number of shares has increased to 2 billion and the market capitalization 
has increased to Rs. 375 billion, the price of each share in an efficient market 
would typically reach equilibrium around Rs. 187.50 per share. In order to 
raise its stake to 50.1%, Company A would have to pay Rs. 187.50 for each 
of 701 shares, amounting to a little over Rs. 131.25 billion. The total cost of 
acquisition for Company A would be Rs. 187.5 billion reflecting an 88.5% 
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increase, almost in inverse proportion to the discount issued to the 
shareholders under the rights issue. Assuming that Company A would have 
to pay a premium of Rs. 15 per share to the tendering shareholders of 
Company B, the total cost of acquisition would be Rs. 200.25 billion. 
Indian takeover law also requires an acquirer to price its offer based on 
certain parameters.
198
 Thus, in Scenario 2, Company A would not be able to 
make an offer to the shareholders of Company B at a discount to market 
price (accounting for the rights issue), even if it were able to convince 
Company B’s shareholders to tender shares at a discount, which is unlikely. 
Since all shareholders would believe that they would stand to gain if the 
rights issue were triggered, typically none of them would tender their shares, 
thwarting the acquirer’s takeover attempts.  
Of course, had the acquirer not been entitled to participate in the rights 
issue at all, the cost of acquisition would have gone up even more, since 
Company A would not have been able to avail itself of a discount in order to 
maintain its stake in Company B. Conversely, if Company A negotiates a 
friendly deal with Company B, then the board needs only to pass a resolution 
approving the deal, assuming that an exception has been carved out in the 
rights issue offer documents for friendly deals. 
3. Possible Difficulties With The Rights Issue Approach 
There are difficulties with the rights issue route, in addition to the agency 
costs and transaction costs problems highlighted above. One such difficulty 
for target corporations is the prospect of the hostile acquirer replacing the 
board before the rights issue is consummated. This difficulty is capable of 
being addressed. First, a hostile acquirer may not be able to buy sufficient 
time to replace the board. The Takeover Code provides that the offer to 
tender shares must remain open for a period of twenty days.
199
 During this 
offer period, the acquirer is prohibited from replacing the board.
200
 This 
ensures that, during the offer period, the target board of directors can freely 
pursue the rights issue under the exception to the prohibition against 
scorched earth tactics discussed above. The rights issue period must remain 
open for a mandatory period of fifteen days, which means that a rights issue, 
in theory, is capable of conclusion prior to the close of the tender offer 
period.
201
 Additionally, even assuming that a rights issue has not been 
 
 
 198. Id. § 20.  
 199. Takeover Code § 22(5). 
 200. Id. § 22(7).  
 201. Takeover Code § 22(12). 
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entirely consummated as the tender offer concludes, the hostile acquirer 
would still have to go through the process of convening an extraordinary 
general meeting in order to replace the board, a process which could take 
another forty-five days from the date of deposit of requisition to convene the 
meeting.
202
 Second, a truly staggered board, as discussed below, may make it 
impossible for the hostile acquirer to replace the board before the rights issue 
is triggered. 
The next difficulty is one of interpretation: what if the aforementioned 
interpretation of the record date provision of the ICDR Regulations meets 
regulatory hurdles? In other words, what if the hostile acquirer cannot be 
excluded from participating in the rights issue through the record date 
tactics? The poison pill may still work, since the consequent capital infusion 
may still make it inordinately expensive for the hostile acquirer to acquire the 
corporation even at the discount. Using the previous hypothetical, if 
Company A gains a 50.1% stake in the corporation and is entitled to 
participate in the rights issue, it would still have to pay a total of over Rs. 
87.5 billion for 501 million newly issued shares. The only difficulty with this 
approach is that Company A may refuse to participate in the rights issue 
altogether. Recall that a rights issue requires 90% subscription. However, it is 
unclear if an offer by a shareholder to subscribe beyond its own shareholding 
in a proposed rights issue would satisfy this 90% requirement.
203
 If so, the 
promoters of Company B would be entitled to subscribe to more than their 
entitlement, in the event that the rights issue is unsubscribed, and perhaps 
sidestep this difficulty. As a result, the promoters would then incur heavy 
costs in thwarting a takeover attempt. Although the promoters may then 
perhaps be able to pay themselves out through dividend or a share buyback, 
regaining control over the corporation would not come cheaply and 
burdensome transaction costs would still be incurred. 
There is one final difficulty that may hinder the defensive capabilities of 
the rights issue. A rights issue typically carries a right of renunciation: 
shareholders entitled to participate in a rights issue may renounce their rights 
in favor of the acquirer. However, there are two reasons for which 
renunciation may have only a minimal effect on the defensive rights issue. 
First, even if the shareholders renounce their rights in favor of a hostile 
acquirer, the hostile acquirer may either incur heavy costs of acquisition by 
participating in the offer or simply refuse to exercise the rights. The latter 
option exposes the acquirer to the risk that the promoter group subscribes 
 
 
 202. See The Companies Act § 169(c). 
 203. While this appears to be done in practice, the decision of the Gujarat High Court, within a 
different context, is instructive. See In re Mafatlal Indus. Ltd., (1995) 84 Comp. Cas. 230 (Guj) (India).  
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(either directly or through a white knight) to the shares. Of course, if this 
Article’s interpretation of the record date provision does not hold water, a 
hostile acquirer entitled to participate in the offer may renounce its rights in 
favor of a third party. As a practical matter, though, this entire problem can 
be obviated by placing a provision in the articles of the corporation that 
provides that a rights issue does not carry with it the right of renunciation.
204
  
D. The Ex Ante Employee Stock Option Plan Defense 
The Takeover Code seems only to prohibit a reactive issue of shares by 
the target’s board, but makes no mention of the exercise by employees of a 
previously issued option to purchase equity during the hostile acquirer’s 
mandatory offer period. It has thus been suggested that an employee stock 
option plan (ESOP) could be used as a takeover defense in India.
205
 In fact, a 
prudent corporation might even be able to use this route to defend itself from 
potential acquisition ex ante, before the company’s shares are listed on a 
national stock exchange.
206
 While an ESOP scheme, including one 
containing a potential defensive mechanism, adopted after listing would 
require a special resolution of shareholders to enact it,
207
 a preexisting plan 
appears to require nothing more than mere disclosure in the offer document 
at the stage of listing.
208
 If an ESOP does require a special resolution of 
shareholders, such a resolution would likely be easier to obtain before a 
company is listed rather than after. Further, employees (but not promoters)
209
 
can be given non-transferable
210
 rights to purchase stock in the corporation at 
discounted
211
 levels that may be exercised or accelerated when an acquirer 
crosses a certain threshold.  
An ESOP-based pill would achieve the dual purpose of diluting the 
acquirer’s holding by excluding the acquirer and providing shares at a 
discount. It could also be justified by the target board more easily as 
safeguarding other constituencies’ interests: employees whose services may 
 
 
 204. The Companies Act § 81(1)(c). 
 205. Luthra, supra note 153.  
 206. Section 26(5)(b) of the ICDR Regulations permits a corporation to continue with its 
employee stock option plan, provided accounting guidelines and rules are followed. 
 207. Securities and Exchange Board of India (Employee Stock Option Scheme and Employee 
Stock Purchase Scheme) Guidelines, 1999, Gazette of India, section 6.1 (1999), available at http:// 
www.sebi.gov.in/acts/stockoption.pdf [hereinafter Stock Option Guidelines].  
 208. Id. § 15.3. 
 209. Id. § 4.2-4.3 (prohibiting promoters or directors with more than a 10% stake from 
participating in an ESOP scheme).  
 210. Id. § 11. 
 211. Id. § 8.1.  
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be terminated consequent to hostile acquisition. However, in order for the 
ESOP scheme to achieve the dilution and capital infusion ends of a poison 
pill, it would have to confer substantial rights on its employees, and ESOP 
schemes are not conventionally designed to achieve such high levels of 
dilution. The dilution achieved by an ESOP-based pill would also tend to 
dilute the stakes of all existing shareholders, which may raise concerns of 
minority shareholder oppression. In order to be effective, an ESOP-based 
defensive mechanism may therefore have to work in tandem with some other 
form of discounted equity issuance to existing shareholders. 
Alternatively, a rights issue pill could potentially be used in tandem with 
an ―Employee Stock Purchase Scheme,‖ which may enable the target’s 
employees to participate
212
 in the issue at a substantially discounted price,
213
 
a route which may not otherwise be open to the target since any issue of 
shares besides a rights issue is prohibited by the Takeover Code during the 
hostile acquirer’s tender offer period.  
IV. STAGGERED BOARD, EMBEDDED DEFENSES, AND THE FUTURE OF THE 
INDIAN BOARDROOM 
Besides the Press Note 2 defense and the poison pill defense (which may 
take the form of share warrants, a rights issue, or an ESOP plan), there exist 
other defensive mechanisms for thwarting hostile acquisition attempts, either 
in conjunction with the poison pills or by themselves. As previously 
discussed, although the staggered board is the default position under Indian 
company law from which corporations may opt out, any director of a 
corporation can be removed without cause by ordinary resolution.
214
 
However, directors cannot be removed in this way when the articles of the 
corporation provide that two-thirds of the directors may be appointed by 
proportional representation.
215
 Since the articles of an Indian corporation can 
only be amended with a whopping 75% supermajority, attempting to ―un-
stagger‖ the board by making directors amenable to summary removal would 
be exceedingly difficult for the hostile acquirer to achieve.  
 
 
 212. Under the Stock Option Guidelines, an ―employee stock purchase scheme‖ is defined as ―a 
scheme under which the company offers shares to employees as part of a public issue or otherwise.‖ 
Stock Option Guidelines § 2.1(4). This tends to indicate that an employee stock purchase scheme 
(ESPS) does not enable a corporation to offer shares to its employees by itself, but only permits it to 
enable employees to participate in an offer of securities.  
 213. See id.  
 214. The Companies Act § 284. 
 215. Id. § 265.  
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Embedded defenses are not unknown to the Indian corporate world,
216
 
although they are typically adopted for value-enhancing purposes. For 
example, corporate managers may incorporate penalty provisions into third-
party contracts that are triggered upon a change of control.
217
 Although these 
typically seek to protect third-party interests, they can certainly be adopted 
for defensive purposes. One Indian industrial house may even have devised a 
mechanism by which the hostile acquisition of a subsidiary would preclude 
the use by the hostile acquirer or the acquired target of the trademarks which 
vest in the target’s parent.218 Such embedded defenses are known to have at 
least two drawbacks. For one, they may reduce the value of the firm. For 
two, they may deter friendly deals.
219
 Since the payout following the hostile 
acquisition trigger would be made to third parties as against shareholders 
(who, in a pill plan, would theoretically be able to benefit by purchasing 
discounted shares in the corporation), embedded defenses tend to reduce the 
value of the company more than a pill plan, assuming efficient markets and 
the absence of information asymmetries (i.e., the market is aware of the 
contents of such agreements and of embedded defenses). Multiple third-party 
contracts that trigger penalties upon a change of control without the prior 
written consent of the third party would accrue costs that are likely to deter a 
friendly deal unless the third party is a holding company in the same 
promoter group as the target and consent can easily be obtained. Third-party 
embedded defenses also leave open the possibility of the hostile acquirer 
renegotiating penalty triggers, where the contracts are entered into with true 
third parties rather than with holding companies. A conventional poison pill 
plan may therefore involve fewer costs to the target board than embedded 
value-reducing defenses.  
This Article has focused primarily on the vulnerability of Indian 
corporations to hostile takeover and the ability of promoters to defend 
themselves from hostile onslaught. However, in so doing, the Article has 
intentionally eschewed policy questions relating to whether such defensive 
tactics are in the best interests of the corporation. Nevertheless, it is worth 
noting that Indian courts have consistently held that actions taken to benefit 
 
 
 216. In 1995, the Supreme Court of India upheld a provision in a contract which enabled a party to 
terminate the contract in the event of a ―change of control‖ in the other party (corporation). It held that 
the provision did not violate the principle of free transferability of shares. Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. v. 
Coca Cola Co., (1995) 5 S.C.C. 545 (India).  
 217. For a complete description and analysis of ―embedded defenses‖ as against conventional 
shark repellent tactics, see Jennifer Arlen & Eric Talley, Unregulable Defenses and the Perils of 
Shareholder Choice, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 577 (2003).  
 218. Luthra, supra note 153.  
 219. See Arlen & Talley, supra note 187, at 630.  
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the directors alone, as opposed to the larger interests of the corporation, 
would constitute an ―abuse of fiduciary power.‖220 Decades ago, Delaware’s 
courts acknowledged the ―omnipresent specter‖ of the board acting in its own 
self-interest when employing defensive tactics.
221
 Current debates center on 
the board’s fiduciary duty to redeem the pill in the face of a hostile 
acquisition.
222
 Speaking in a historic decision over two decades ago, the 
words of Chancellor William T. Allen still resonate in both India and the 
United States: ―shareholder franchise is the ideological underpinning upon 
which the legitimacy of directorial power rests.‖223  
India’s Takeover Code shields shareholders of the target corporation from 
certain coercive tender offers by requiring the acquirer to take up shares on a 
proportionate basis
224
 rather than on a hasty first-come, first-served basis, by 
keeping the offer open for a minimum period of twenty days,
225
 and by 
theoretically foreclosing the possibility of a partial or two-tiered tender 
offer.
226
 These inherent defenses call into question the need for additional 
shark repellent defensive mechanisms. While shark repellent tactics devised 
to benefit shareholders and the corporation may certainly assuage duty of 
loyalty-type fears, the entrenchment of promoter interests may satisfy neither 
the requirements of the duty of loyalty nor the needs of a robust economy.  
On July 19, 2010, the Takeover Regulations Advisory Committee 
(TRAC) appointed by SEBI issued recommendations to substantially modify 
India’s Takeover Code.227 Their recommendations have not been enforced as 
this Article goes to print, but six proposed changes are particularly relevant if 
they are eventually adopted by SEBI. (1) Early Warnings: TRAC has 
suggested that every acquisition of 2% or more beyond 5% triggers a 
disclosure requirement.
228
 However, the ability of an acquirer to circumvent 
 
 
 220. See, e.g., Needle Indus. v. Newey, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1298 (India); Nanalal Zaver v. Bombay 
Life Assurance, A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 172 (India).  
 221. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petrol. Co., 493 A.2d 946, 953–55 (Del. 1985). 
 222. Marcel Kahan, Paramount or Paradox: The Delaware Supreme Court’s Takeover 
Jurisprudence, 19 J. CORP. L. 583 (1994); Augliera, supra note 155.  
 223. Blasius Indus. Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988).  
 224. Takeover Code § 21(6).  
 225. Id. § 22(5). 
 226. Once the hostile acquirer has complied with its obligations of making a tender offer for a 
minimum 20% of the target’s shares, while complying with the Takeover Code’s pricing guidelines, 
the acquirer may not, going forward, cross the 15% threshold by upwards of 5% without making a 
mandatory tender offer at prescribed prices. Similarly, after crossing the 55% threshold, any 
acquisition would trigger a mandatory tender offer requirement.  
 227. SEC. & EXCH. BD. OF INDIA, REPORT OF THE TAKEOVER REGULATIONS ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE, proposed regulation 28 (July 19, 2010), available at http://www.sebi.gov.in/commreport/ 
tracreport.pdf [hereinafter Takeover Report].  
 228. See id. 
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this provision within two business days
229
 remains unchanged. (2) Tender 
Offer Trigger: TRAC has proposed raising the mandatory tender offer trigger 
from 15% to 25%.
230
 This would enable potential hostile acquirers to 
aggregate larger stakes in corporations before triggering tender offer 
requirements. (3) Creeping Acquisition: TRAC has advised permitting 
―creeping acquisitions‖ to exceed 55%231 subject to 5% caps, thereby 
enabling promoters to consolidate their holdings. (4) Offer Size: TRAC has 
recommended that the minimum tender offer size should now be ―all the 
shares held by all the other shareholders of the target,‖232 from 20%. This 
requirement hurts friendly acquirers more than it does potentially hostile 
ones, since friendly acquirers who want to hold stakes larger than 25% in 
listed entities must now face the financial risk of the tender of shares by all 
remaining shareholders in a mandatory tender offer. Thus, they can no longer 
limit their exposure to 20% if the TRAC recommendations become law. On 
the other hand, the prospect of larger stakes in the target would perhaps not 
dissuade hostile acquirers to the same extent, although they too must face the 
risk of purchasing all shares tendered, not merely those sufficient to enable 
them to control the corporation. (5) Asset Alienation: TRAC has 
recommended that acquirers be permitted to declare their intention to alienate 
―material assets‖ of the target,233 which may enhance their ability to raise 
finances for hostile acquisitions. (6) Defensive Measures: Perhaps TRAC’s 
most significant recommendation is its recommendation to explicitly inhibit 
the target board’s ability to pursue defensive tactics. If TRAC’s 
recommendations become law, ESOP-based pills
234
 and the rights issue-
based pill
235
 suggested in this Article would no longer be possible, thereby 
rendering Indian corporations that much more vulnerable to the hostile 
acquisition. 
 
 
 229. See discussion supra Part II.B.  
 230. See Takeover Report proposed regulation 3(1).  
 231. See id. proposed regulation 3(2). 
 232. See id. proposed regulation 7(1). 
 233. See id. proposed regulation 25(2).  
 234. See id. proposed regulation 26(2)(f).  
 235. See id. proposed regulation 26(2)(c)(iii). 
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